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TO REGULATE, OR NOT TO REGULATE-
IS THAT THE QUESTION?
REFLECTIONS ON TIE SUPPOSED DILEMMA BE-
TWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
by Michael M. Berger*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the old days we had such abundant land and the land was so rich
that waste didn't seem to matter. But millions of acres of our prime
agricultural land has fallen to the tract builders and much more is
doomed. Litter, endless billboards, honkytonk commercialism, and
banal slurb construction line the highways. Poisons and sewage pollute
our bays, lakes and rivers. Smog chokes Los Angeles, but what the San
Francisco Bay Area and the Central Valley can anticipate will make
Los Angeles seem desirable. And this is but part of the story.
Despite the awesome political power of those who make money in the
process of polluting and destroying the resources of California, we have
it within our power to halt the spread of blight and to return this bright
land to the splendor it once was. Right now, today, we have the con-
stitutional right, the technology and the money. The problem is how
to muster them.1
* J.D. 1967, Washington University; L.L.M. 1968, University of Southern California;
Member, California, Missouri, and United States Supreme Court bars; Adjunct Professor
of Law, Loyola University of Los Angeles. The aiithor is a member of the Beverly Hills
law firm of Fadem, Berger & Stocker. Agreeing with Justice Douglas that private practi-
tioners who may have "axes to grind" should so note when they enter the scholarly lists,
so that "Etihe reader . . . know[s] through what spectacles his adviser is viewing the
problem" (Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. Rav. 227, 228-30
(1965)), the author notes the following: his practice consists of representing property
owners in real property litigation. As such, he has sought to invalidate or obtain com-
pensation for the enactment and enforcement of certain types of land use regulations.
On the other hand, he has represented some governmental entities. Furthermore, he has
participated in "environmental" litigation seeking to slow or curb thoughtless develop-
ment. A final note: this article has been in the author's head for some time. The
catalyst which caused it to leap forth was Professor Robert W. Benson's Book Review
in a recent issue of this journal. This may help to explain what some might see as un-
due prominence given that book review herein. Enough digression.
1. W. BRONsON, How TO KILL A GOLDEN STATE 9, 10-11 (1968).
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Growth begets problems. Thoughtless growth invites disaster.2
That much is probably stipulated.3 We have long passed beyond the
days when those who are concerned about the adverse environmental
effects of growth, development and "progress" can be dismissed as
"little old ladies in tennis shoes" or caricatured as the civil counter-
parts of religious fanatics proclaiming the end of the world.
We've got trouble, folks, right here in River City, as the Music
Man would have put it. Trouble brought on by burgeoning popula-
tion. 5 Trouble brought on by desires to escape the inner city and live
in suburbia. Trouble brought on by increased recreational time, caus-
ing an increase in the need for recreational areas. All of these troubles
converge on one limited resource for their solution-land. Land is
needed for living space. Land is needed for recreation. The bigger
our population becomes, the further our cities sprawl. What used to
be farms and open fields are now suburbs. Areas available for recrea-
tion not only shrink, but also retreat further into the hinterlands. In-
deed, one of the problems is that the "hinterlands" are disappearing:
The utter disregard for the integrity of the land and its relationship to
man by powerful corporate executives, together with smaller partici-
pants caught up in this frantic cycle of devastation, inflicts special penal-
ties on the young and the unborn who are so little represented. The
uses of land resources throughout America must be brought under a
working philosophy of trust, buttressed by fair, democratically enforced
laws and far-sighted planning. This is the same philosophy of trust
which inspired the conservationists' partial victory early in the century
when the federal government secured and protected large portions of
public lands and forests. The demands on our natural resources are
2. For some of this author's earlier comments, see Fadem & Berger, A Noisy Airport
Is A Damned Nuisance!, 3 Sw. U.L. REv. 39, 39-44 (1971).
3. For recent exhaustive studies, see, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIEs, Tim QUIET
REVOLUTION iN LAND USE CONTROL (C.E.Q. 1971); POWER AND LAND IN CALIFORNIA:
THE RALPH NADER TASK FORCE REPORT ON LAND USE IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (R.
Fellmeth ed. 1971); W. ROrGERS, CORPORATE CouNTRY: A STATE SHAPED TO SUIT
TECHNOLOGY (1973) [hereinafter cited as RoDaERs]; J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRON-
MENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971) [hereinafter cited as SAX]; THE USE
OF LAND: A CITzENS' POLICY GuiDE TO URBAN GROWTH-A TASK FORCE REPORT
SPONSORED By THE ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND (W. Reilly ed. 1973).
4. See RODGERS, supra note 3; Berger, You Know I Can't Hear You When the Planes
Are Flying, 4 URBAN LAW. 1, 4-5 (1972); Friedman, The Operational Impact of NEPA
and Related Environmental Laws, Regulations, and Orders on Mineral Operations, 19
ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 47, 50 (1974).
5. Cf. Gibbons, Law in an Age of Social Change, 57 A.B.A.J. 151, 152 (1971)
("Itihe murder rate of any area may be predicted very accurately by knowing no more
than its density of population").
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now much greater and much more critical. And time is not so plefiti-
ful for the exercise of indifference. 6
Concern for the future is not only called for but also here. It may
be. seen in legislative enactments .at the highest -levels,' and in the
seemingly endless flow of litigation which may, in one way or another,
be placed beneath the broad umbrella labeled "enVironmental."
Thus, we have a problem, one for which even the most callous
express concern. But what do we do about it? The facile answer,
of course, is "make it illegal to degrade the environment." In our peo-
ple's fascination with laws, it is often presumed that if something.is in-
wanted, it may simply be forbidden. And that is the end of it. , But
this isn't the "Wild West" anymore, and we can't solve all problems
with one squeeze on the trigger. First, the problem is too complex;
it is in fact an incredible complex of interrelated problems. Second,
and perhaps more important, it is largely a question of judgment. One
man's "degradation" is another's dream. "When Keats wrote, 'Beauty
is truth, truth beauty,' he did not solve -very much with the phrase.
Both halves of the explanation are vague." s  Thus, it is all very well
for Congress to soleianly pronounce:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity "on
the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particu-
larly the profound influences of population growth, high-density urbani-
zation, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expand-
ing technological advances and recognizing further the critical impor-
tance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall
welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing pol-
icy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local gov-
ernments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use
all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical as-
sistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote -the general wel-
fare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
6. Nader, Introduction, in 1 PowER AND LAND iN CAMirOmNuL: Tim RALPH NADER
TAsK FORCE REPORT ON LAND USE IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA xxviii (R. F ellmeth ed.
1971). Securing public title to land, however, is no guarantee of enlightened manage-
ment. For critiques of regulation, use and misuse of public land, see A. SAKOLSKI, LAND
TENURE ANm LAND TAXATIoN iN AMERICA (1957); SAX, supra note 3.
7. E.g., Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970); National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970); Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §
1653(f) (1970); Airport and Airway Development Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1716(c) (4) (1970);
Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 21000 (West Supp. 1975);
Coastal Zone Conservation Act, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE ANN. § 27001 (West Supp.
1975).
8. Steinberg, Introduction to Aesthetics vs. Free Enterprise-A Symposiumr PRAc.
LAW., Feb., 1969, at 17, 18.
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exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.0
And for the California Legislature with equal fervor to intone:
The Legislature further finds and declares that it is the policy of the
state to:
(a) Develop and maintain a high-quality environment now and in the
future, and take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and en-
hance the environmental quality of the state.
(b) Take all action necessary to provide the people of this state with
clean air and water, enjoyment of aesthetic, natural, scenic, and historic
environmental qualities, and freedom from excessive noise.
(c) Prevent the elimination of fish or wildlife species due to man's ac-
tivities, insure that fish and wildlife populations do not drop below self-
perpetuating levels, and preserve for future generations representations
of all plant and animal communities and examples of the major periods
of California history.
(d) Ensure that the long-term protection of the environment shall be
the guiding criterion in public decisions.
(e) Create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony to fulfill the social and economic require-
ments of present and future generations.
(f) Require governmental agencies at all levels to develop standards
and procedures necessary to protect environmental quality.
(g) Require governmental agencies at all levels to consider qualitative
factors as well as economic and technical factors and long-term benefits
and costs, in addition to short-term benefits and costs and to consider
alternatives to proposed actions affecting the environment. 10
It is all very well, but it does not solve any specific problems."
Specific problems must be dealt with at the local level, by local gov-
erning bodies and sometimes individual property owners.' 2  Thus, the
9. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
10. CAL. PUB. RES. CoDE ANN. § 21001 (West Supp. 1975).
11. See generally SAx, supra note 3. As Judge Feinberg noted in Hanly v. Mitchell,
460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972):
This case raises important issues under the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq., a statute whose meaning is more uncertain than
most, not merely because it is relatively new, but also because of the generality of
its phrasing.
Id. at 642.
12. One interesting example of this-in a slightly different, but related field-is in
the protection of airport neighbors from property damage, personal injuries and emo-
tional distress caused by noisy aircraft. (For a general discussion of the problems as
seen by this author, see Berger, The California Supreme Court-A Shield Against Gov-
ernmental Overreaching: Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 9 CAUF. W.L. REv. 199
(1973); Berger, Nobody Loves An Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 631 (1970); Berger, You
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plaint for simple laws that will make the problems go away is being
expressed at the local level as a demand for stringent regulation of land
use. Such regulation takes many forms, ranging from "down-zoning"
(i.e., rezoning property to a less intensive use---sometimes leaving
some realistic use for the property, sometimes not) to open space zon-
ing, to zoning for uses which are really public rather than private, to
freezes and moratoria on development.
These practices, and their various consequences and effects on the
public in general, individual property owners in particular, and our ele-
mental constitutional framework, are the subject of this article.
To alleviate the suspense, I do not recommend either uncontrolled
use of property or regulated stultification. Nor is it urged here that
resources which are needed for the general public welfare should not
be regulated to that end. What is urged is that "the public" take a
long, hard look at what its needs are, assess all the costs involved, and
proceed accordingly. If "the public" wants land uses (or non-uses)
which benefit "the public" generally, then "the public" should buy the
property, or an appropriate interest in the property, rather than attempt
to force individual property owners to devote their property to public
use without compensation. These thoughts are perhaps best summed
up in the words of three distinguished academicians: Arvo Van Al-
styne, Frank Michelman, and Gideon Kanner. As Professor Van Al-
styne put it:
The fundamental question that should be faced, and which deserves
a rationally developed legislative response, is not whether these costs will
be paid; it is who will pay them, in accordance with what substantive
and procedural criteria, and through which institutional arrangements.13
Know I Can't Hear You When the Planes Are Flying, 4 URAN LAW. 1 (1972); Fadem
& Berger, A Noisy Airport is a Damned Nuisance!, 3 Sw. U.L. REv. 39 (1971)). In
19658, Congress enacted a law requiring federal noise standards for aircraft (49 U.S.C.
§ 1431 (Supp. II 1972)) in order to provide "present and future relief and protection to
the public . . . from aircraft noise . . . ." Id. Yet the FAA, which sets the federal
standards, consistently takes the position that it is up to the local airport operators to
insure that the noise levels FAA sets actually provide relief, e.g., by appropriate land
use planning. This cop-out may be found, for example, in the preamble to the FAA's
noise standards (34 Fed. Reg. 18358 (1969)), in FAA decisions refusing to take action
to curb noise at specific airports (In re Dreifus, FAA Regulatory Docket No. 9071
(1969)), in correspondence dealing with the local regulation of noise (letter from
Charles J. Peters (for General Counsel Nathaniel Goodrich) to Robert F. Nuttmann,
Ass't County Counsel, Orange County, Calif., July 23, 1969) and in law review articles
(Danforth, Mercury's Children In The Urban Trap: Community Planning and Federal
Regulation Of the Yet Source, 3 URBAN LAw. 206, 213-18 (1971)).
13. Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative
Modification in California, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 491, 543-44 (1969).
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Thus, as Professor Michelman concluded:
[There is a] need for resolute sophistication in the face of occa-
sional insistence that compensation payments must be limited lest society
find itself unable to afford beneficial plans and improvements. What
society cannot, indeed, afford is to impoverish itself. It cannot afford
to instigate measures whose costs, including costs which remain "unso-
cialized," exceed their benefits. Thus, it would appear that any meas-
ure which society cannot afford or, putting it another way, is unwilling
to finance under conditions of full compensation, society cannot afford
at all.1
4
Or as Professor Kanner pithily summed it all up:
There is no such thing as a free lunch.15
11. ARGUMENT BY DEFINITIONAL IPSE DIXlT; OR, Do WE REALLY
CARE WHETHER STRINGENT REGULATION OF PROPERTY Is So
SEVERE THAT IT IS A "TAKING" OF PROPERTY WHICH
CANNOT-UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT- BE
WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION?
The stormy intellectual flap that has been raging recently over just
how close to the brink governmental regulation of land use may go be-
fore running afoul of constitutional proscription has been centered, al-
most entirely, on the issue whether the regulation constitutes a "tak-
ing" of private property for public use.Y6 If it is not a "taking"-so
say the exponents of regulation-then it is legal, regardless of its conse-
quences on individual property owners. And "taking" is seen as being
only an actual, physical seizure.
There are answers to that argument, and we will deal with it ex-
tensively in time. 17  But a more important question to broach at the
outset is, 'hy frame the issue in such extreme, antediluvian terms?"
The notion that the "taking" of real property is the same as the "tak-
14. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1165, 1181 (1967) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Michelman]. For express judicial adoption of the "cost
socialization" approach, see Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 303, 475 P.2d 441,
445, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (1970).
15. Address by Professor Gideon Kanner, Property Rights v. Public Need: There Is
No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, Victor Gruen Foundation for Environmental Planning
Symposium, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sept. 18, 1973.
16. E.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, Tim TAXINo IssuE: AN ANALYsIS
OF THE CONSTITUTONAL LImIrrs OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973) [hereinafter cited as
THm TAKiNG IssuE]; Benson, Book Review, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 652 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Benson].
17. See notes 69-115 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
big" of the simplest item of personal property18 has been dead for so
long that one noted scholar has referred to it as "anachronistic" and
"outmoded," 19 another calls it "primordial," 20 a third calls it "primi-
tive," 2' and the premier text on eminent domain concludes:
The modern and prevailing view is that any substantial interference
with private property which destroys or lessens its value or by which the
owner's right to its use or enjoyment is in any substantial degree
abridged or destroyed, is, in fact and in law, a "taking" in the constitu-
tional sense, to the extent of the damages suffered, even though the title
and possession of the owner remains undisturbed.
22
Aside from this troglodytic view of "taking," a more serious ques-
tion is posed from the standpoint of intellectual honesty, not to men-
tion pragmatic utility.23 Why structure the argument in such a fashion
that a regulation is seen to violate the constitutional proscription only
if it is so severe that it effects a "taking"? The only answer this author
can muster is that it is easier to respond to an extreme proposition.
The intellectual, and pragmatic, problem that arises is that many state
constitutions go beyond the simple notion that compensation must be
provided when property is "taken" and require payment for property
"taken or damaged."24  Moreover, in some states, whose constitutions
contain only "taking" clauses, the courts have construed them as includ-
ing damaging.25
Using The Taking Issue by Bosselman, Callies and Banta as an ex-
ample, 20 nowhere in its 329 pages of text and footnotes and five pages
18. E.g., unless I actually intend to pick up your coffee pot (or apparently your
house) and steal away with it, I haven't "taken" it.
19. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 n.5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Van
Alstyne].
20. Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and
Prospect, 71 DiC. L. REv. 207, 210 (1967).
21. Beuscher, Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the
Courts: Inverse Condemnation, in 1. BEUSCHER & R. WRIGHT, LAND USE 72, 728
(1969).
22. 2 P. NicHoLs, THE LAw OF EMumaNT DOMAIN 407 (3d ed. J. Sackman ed. 1963)
[hereinafter cited as NicHoLs].
23. The Bosselman, Callies and Banta tome has been praised because "Etihe legal
analysis is pragmatic .... ." Benson, supra note 16, at 656.
24. For a collection of citations to such provisions, see 2 NICHOLS, supra note 22,
§ 6.1[3]. Article I, section 14 of the California constitution is one such provision.
25. E.g., Morrison v. Clackamas County, 18 P.2d 814, 816 (Ore. 1933); Luber v.
Milwaukee County, 177 N.W.2d 380, 386 (Wis. 1970).
26. A proposition which is only fair, as that book promises to become, if it has not
already become, the classic work in the field.
1975]
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of prefatory material is the existence of such constitutional provisions
mentioned. To be fair, the "damage" clauses are alluded to once:
The state courts also construed a taking of property in very tangible
terms. They thought of a taking as an actual appropriation of the prop-
erty by the taker for the latter's own use. There now began rumblings
of concern over this strict interpretation. Dissatisfaction with denial of
compensation in cases involving damage to owners of abutting property
in street-grade cases, such as Rigney v. City of Chicago, contributed to
the passage of state constitutional amendments by Illinois and other
states to make sure that such losses were compensated.
27
But that is all. There is no citation to any of the state constitutional
amendments; nor is there any indication that the amendments deal with
anything other than damage to abutting owners in street-grade cases.
The authors then proceed to launch their all-out attack on Justice
Holmes and the decision he rendered for the Court in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,28 as being the devil that caused all the land regula-
tion problems.
Why was the "damaged" clause ducked? Surely Bosselman, Callies
and Banta, practicing Illinois lawyers, are familiar with such a clause.
Their own state's constitution contains one.29 The effect of its addi-
tion to the Illinois constitution was the subject of two decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. 0 In Chicago v. Taylor,31 a case arising
after the addition of the "or damaged" clause to the Illinois constitu-
tion, the Court stated:
Such a change in the organic law of the State was not meaningless. But
it would be meaningless if it should be adjudged that the Constitution
of 1870 gave no additional or greater security to private property, sought
to be appropriated to public use, than was guaranteed by the former
Constitution.32
One suspects that the "damaged" clause was avoided because it is
the real problem confronting local planning agencies and because it is
a lot tougher to deal with. And therein lies the danger for those who
27. THa TAKING IssuE, supra note 16, at 122 (footnotes omitted). As Professor Hag-
man notes in a review of the book, there are other shortcomings: "Due process is only
briefly mentioned and equal protection is virtually ignored." Hagman, Book Review,
87 H v. L. Rnv. 482 (1973).
28. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
29. ILL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 15.
30. Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888); Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99
U.S. 635 (1879).
31. 125 U.S. 161 (1888).
32. Id. at 168-69.
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uncritically follow these pied pipers of public proscription. Indeed, the
effect of the addition of such clauses was profound. As the California
Supreme Court held:
To what kind of damage does this word "damaged" refer? We think
it refers to something more than a direct or immediate damage to pri-
vate property, such as its invasion or spoliation. There is no reason why
this word should be construed in any other than its ordinary and popu-
lar sense. It embraces more than the taking. If it did not refer to more
than the damage above mentioned, the word "damaged" in the clause
relied on would be superfluous. It seems to us that the direct invasions
spoken of would come within the clause as it stood in the constitution
of 1849. If the word "damaged" only embraced physical invasions of
property, the right secured by this word would add nothing to the guar-
anty as it formerly stood ...
We cannot think that the convention inserting in the constitution of
this state the word "damaged" in the connection in which it is found,
and the people in ratifying the work of the convention, intended to limit
the effect of this word to cases where the party injured already had a
remedy to recover compensation. They engaged in no such empty and
vain work. It was intended to give a remedy, as well where one existed
before as where it did not; to superadd to the guaranty found in the
former constitution of this state, and in nearly all of the other states,
a guaranty against damage where none previously existed.
83
Other commentators, perhaps less bent on grinding any particular
axe than in providing guidance to legislative bodies trying to deal ra-
tionally with the problem, do not duck the issue. For example, Profes-
sor Van Aistyne, who has for years served as consultant to the Califor-
nia Law Revision Commission, 4 concluded in one of his many schol-
arly reports that it was of little help to say that government need only
pay for what it physically seizes and may "regulate" willy-nilly without
fear. And the reason was the "damaged" clause:
Finally, the questionable value of this theoretical approach seems to
be even further reduced in a jurisdiction where, like California, the con-
stitution requires payment of just compensation for a "damaging" as well
as a "taking" of private property. It is clear, historically, that the dam-
age clauses were introduced precisely for the purpose of enlarging com-
33. Reardon v. City & County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 501, 505, 6 P. 317,
322-23, 325-26 (1885) (emphasis added); accord, Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62
Cal. 2d 250, 256-63, 398 P.2d 129, 132-37, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92-97 (1965); Brown v.
City of Seattle, 31 P. 313, 314 (Wash. 1892).
34. Professor Van AIstyne's views have often been relied on by the California Su-
preme Court. E.g., Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 933-35, 496 P.2d
480, 489-90, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568, 577-78 (1972).
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pensability beyond the outer limits seemingly marked by traditional judi-
cial acceptance of physicial invasion as the test of a "taking."
The appropriation-regulation approach thus seems to possess very
dubious utility as a tool of legal analysis. Its principal significance, per-
haps, lies in the implicit suggestion that when a physical invasion, appro-
priation, or use by government of private assets occurs, a presumption
should arise favoring payment of the constitutionally required compen-
sation. This presumption, however, is only a starting point for further
analysis. It may be dispelled by other considerations; and its absence
in a particular case, because of lack of physical appropriation, does not
foreclose compensability in any way, nor even create a contrary pre-
sumption. Its analytical worth is, obviously, of exceedingly modest di-
mensions.35
Where does that leave us? It leaves us with a group of concededly
high-principled reformers whose stated goal is to alleviate the fear in
local planners and governing bodies which is said to inhibit orderly reg-
ulation of growth. 5  But they have pursued their laudable objective
87
in a manner which is misleading at best. If taken literally by officials
in California and other jurisdictions having a "damaged" clause, they
35. Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8
SANTA CLARA LAw. 1, 15-16 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
36. THE TAKING IssuE, supra note 16, at 1; Benson, supra note 16, at 653. It cannot
go without noting, however, that the notion that governmental zeal might be inhibited
by the fear of judicial action is both illusory and discredited. In those situations where
property owners seek invalidation of the ordinance, the fear is illusory. Judicial invali-
dation only hurts governmental feelings. It is nothing more than a public wrist slap.
Hardly a "deterrent."
As for the fear of monetary damages, the inhibiting factor has been thrashed out in
governmental tort cases (compare, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949), with Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 285 n.2, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312, 314 n.2
(1967)). The most concise comment was probably made by the California Supreme
Court in 1968: "The danger that public employees will be insufficiently zealous in their
official duties does not -serve as a basis for immunity in California." Johnson v. State,
69 Cal. 2d 782, 790, 447 P.2d 352, 358, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 246 (1968). The fact that
the "sovereign immunity" doctrine has been graciously interred (see, e.g., Muskopf v.
Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961)) should
be response enough to this specious argument.
37. Frankly, however, I have never observed that "fear" said to exist in land use plan-
ners and their lawyers which supposedly inhibits them both in enacting regulations and
informally negotiating with property owners. (See Benson, supra note 16, at 653-54. I
suspect that some anonymous "staff attorney" for an equally anonymous "statewide land
use agency" (id. at 654 n.10) was pulling Professor Benson's leg.) Quite the contrary.
On this point, my experience parallels that of Professor Sax, who notes that too many
"government lawyers tend to polarize the issues" (SAX, supra note 3, at 197) dealing
not only in blacks and whites (or goods and evils) but also in extreme and often unjusti-
fied blacks and whites. It may have been an aging French monarch who first mouthed
the words, "Tetat, c'est moi," but he has his modern counterparts.
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are being invited recklessly to embark on a program that will lawlessly
injure many innocent property owners and potentially expose the regu-
lators to personal liability.3 8  Is this a rational way to deal with one
of the significant problems of our day?
Ill. THE BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH ANY REGULATORY SCHEME
MUST BE MEASURED IS A COMPLEX MIXTURE OF POLITICAL
BELIEFS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY AMERICAN AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS WHICH ARE UNIVERSAL
One problem with much of what passes for analysis in this field is
the tunnel vision of some of the commentators. They focus only on
a particular problem (e.g., cleaning up the environment). Or only on
a particular tool.39 Or they downplay the side-effects with comments
approximating, "it's not important, it's only money."40  In doing so,
they engage in intellectual self-crippling. Anyone who is interested
in rational problem-solving, must, tl. borrow a phrase from Justice
Cardozo, "make [his] knowledge as deep as the science and as broad
and universal as the culture of [his] day."41
It is therefore important to recall first the distrust in "Big Govern-
ment" which we, as a people, have always had.42 That distrust is the
foundation of much of our constitutional law. As Chief Justice Wright
summarized:
The framers of the Constitution had two paradoxical objectives: first,
to create a durable central government that would mold the separate
states into a federal union; and second, to limit that government by re-
serving certain rights to the states and the people. To accomplish these
ends, the framers returned to the writings of Locke and Montesquieu,
the same sources used in drafting the Declaration of Independence.
These philosophers, who espoused theories of social contract, also advo-
cated systems for the separation of powers designed to protect the na-
tural rights of every person. The framers adapted the separation of
38. See notes 228-29 infra and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., TnE TAKING IssuE, supra note 16, passim.
40. See, e.g., THE USE oF LAND: A CrznNs' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWrH-
A TASK FORCE REPORT SPONSORED BY THE ROCKEFELLER BRonmERS FUND 175 (W.
Reilly ed. 1973); Benson, supra note 16, at 665.
41. Cardozo, Our Lady of the Common Law, 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 231, 232 (1939).
42. See generally Mosk, Privacy in a Crowded World Is Sought, Los Angeles Daily
J., Apr. 22, 1968, (Report Section), at 28; Sullivan, Bill of Rights Are Our Way of Life
-Another View of Our Constitution, Los Angeles Daily J., Jan. 22, 1968, (Report Sec-
tion), at 3; Tobriner, Individual Rights in an Industrialized Society, 54 A.B.AJ. 21
(1968); Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CALIF.
L. REv. 1262 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
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powers theory to their needs and wrote it into the Constitution. They
declared that Congress could legislate only for the purposes specified or
implied in the Constitution and that, in legislating for permissible pur-
poses, Congress could "not transgress any provision of the Constitution
itself." 43
In this scheme of limited government, 44 created by individuals to
protect rights which they inalienably possessed as human beings before
government was invented,"4 the judiciary stands as the individual's bul-
wark against overreaching46 or over-zealous 47 governmental function-
aries.48 This principle has been repeatedly reinforced from Marbury
v. Madison41 through United States v. Nixon. 0  As the United States
Supreme Court recently stated:
Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his rights, nei-
ther liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State's monop-
oly over techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly be said
to be acceptable under our scheme of things. Only by providing that
the social enforcement mechanism must function strictly within these
bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered society that is also just.,'
To begin with, then, we believe in a government of limited power,
with strict limits on the intrusions into the rights of individuals. 2 But
that is only the first step. Of equal importance is to ask, "why?" Be-
43. Wright, supra note 42, at 1264, quoting 1 J. BRYCE, THE AMEICAN COMMON-
WEALTH 242 (3d ed. 1909) (footnote omitted).
44. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 78 (1958) (Warren, C.I., dissenting).
45. Compare Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 368 (1856) (dissenting
opinion), with Benson, supra note 16, at 664.
46. As Mr. Chief Justice Wright recently put it:
The Constitution is a statement of principles designed to allocate powers between
the people and their government. The provisions of that document set forth a sys-
tem of "enduring general values," and perhaps we can describe judicial review as
"institutionalized self-control."
Wright, supra note 42, at 1266 (footnotes omitted).
47. mhe Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. In-
deed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and of the Due Process
Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vul-
nerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may
characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than me-
diocre ones.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (footnote omitted).
48. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1884); Loan Ass'n v.
Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662 (1875); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
119 (1866); Wright, supra note 42, at 1265-68.
49. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
50. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
51. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971).
52. If nothing else, recent events in Washington have demonstrated the wisdom of this
general thesis.
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cause, in order to ascertain how far government may go in regulating
the lives of its citizens, it is essential to understand the deep psychic
underpinnings of the limitation. The obvious answer is that the Consti-
tutional framers had just thrown off the English yoke and wanted to
ensure that no such mechanism would be reimposed. 8 But it goes be-
yond mere experience with the edicts of absolute monarchs.
The answer lies buried in the human psyche. Man is a territorial
being. From earliest times, he has staked his claim to "his little corner
of the world" and has defended it against all intruders. In his seminal
work in psychological anthropology, Robert Ardrey expressed the fol-
lowing sentiments:
Man... is as much a territorial animal as is a mockingbird singing
in the clear California night. We act as we do for reasons of our evolu-
tionary past, not our cultural present, and our behavior is as much a
mark of our species as is the shape of a human thigh bone or the config-
uration of nerves in a comer of the human brain. If we defend the
title to our land or the sovereignty of our country, we do it for reasons
no different, no less innate, no less ineradicable, than do lower animals.
The dog barking at you from behind his master's fence acts for a motive
indistinguishable from that of his master when the fence was built.
Neither are men and dogs and mockingbirds uncommon creatures in
the natural world. . . . [A]ll of us will give everything we are for a
place of our own. Territory, in the evolving world of animals, is a force
perhaps older than sex.54
The recognized psychological consequence of breaching this deep-
seated territorial need is mental and emotional collapse.55
53. If for no other reason, references to the arbitrary actions of Elizabeth I (THE
TAING ISSUE, supra note 16, at 64; Benson, supra note 16, at 657-58; Marcus, Manda-
tory Development Rights, Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's
Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFF. L. Rav. 77, 95 (1974)) are singularly inappropriate to this
type of inquiry.
54. R. ARDmy, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE 5 (1966). See generally H. PROSnAN-
SKY, W. ITrELSON & L. RIVLIN, ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: MAN AND HIs PHYSICAL
SETTING (1970); Carpenter, Territoriality: A Review of Concepts and Problems, in BE-
HAVIOR AND EVOLUTION 224 (A. Roe & S. Simpson eds. 1958); cf. H. HEDIGER, STUDIES
OF PSYCHOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR OF CAPTURED ANIMALS IN Zoos AND CIRCUSES (G. Sir-
corn transl. 1955).
55. E.g., Hall, The Anthropology of Space: An Organizing Model, in H. PROSHANSY,
W. ITTELSON & L. RIVLIN, ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: MAN AND HIS PHYSICAL SET-
TiNG 17 (1970):
Man's feeling about being properly oriented in space runs deep. Such knowledge
is ultimately linked to survival and sanity. To be disoriented in space is to be psy-
chotic.
It is interesting to note that even some of those who might deny what I am saying
here, and claim that our concepts of property derived from feudal law, economics and
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Though the proponents of zealous"land regulation ignore it, the law
has taken care to guard against the clear and present danger of psy-
chotic reaction to territorial invasion. The early development of the
law to satisfy man's needs for territorial protection was well and re-
cently summarized by the court in Watson v. Branch County Bank6:
Historically, one of the great missions of the law has been to bring
disputes concerning the possession of real and personal property under
the control of legal institutions. Except for personal injury, nothing has
been so productive of contention and violence as the dispossession of
tangible property. The taking of goods from another's possession, with-
out the latter's contemporaneous consent, necessarily involves the hos-
tile physical invasion of the possessor's personal territory, and is a se-
rious assault upon his dignity, privacy and self-esteem. Such an inva-
sion naturally tends to excite emotions and to provoke violent retalia-
tion.
-In the Anglo-Saxon period of English history, the law recognized, in-
deed, was almost entirely based upon, the concept of the personal
"peace," or grith. The grith was a person's psychological sphere of in-
terest, marked, with regard to tangibles, by possession and control. The
concern for the integrity of the grith was part of the common law's con-
cern for the preservation of human dignity in the context of a stable
social order. Where a person's "peace" was respected, there was an ab-
sence of violence, and the person's "peace," in its modem connotation,
prevailed. In contrast, where the personal peace was breached or bro-
ken, there was contention and violence. 57
Under our system of law, we have institutionalized and constitu-
tionalized the protection of private property to avoid the inevitable self-
help conflicts which would otherwise surely arise. The underlying
emotional needs remain the same. Man is an animal, with primordial
instincts of territoriality. The government that cuts across their grain
politics that are no longer relevant (Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights, Transfer
and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BuFv. L. REV.
77, 89 (1974)), recognize subconsciously that there is a relevance buried deep within
them.
Especially with regard to real property, there is a deep-seated feeling that it is more
than just a thing that can generate profit. Rather, there exists the feeling that its
location, its position in space, is of its very essence.
Id. at 103.
Rather than dealing with this inexplicable emotion, however, Marcus, like too many
lawyers, prefers to brush it aside as either an intellectual exercise or of no importance
to the practical problem which concerns him. The fact that he felt compelled to add
the two quoted lines-otherwise out of place in the article-speaks eloquently for my
thesis.
56. 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 965-66.
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does so at peril to the social peace and domestic tranquility that are
the first duty of governments.
Man has not changed from earliest recorded memories. 58 That is
why the Bible endures as a present day social guide. Thus, we find
the Tenth Commandment: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house,
thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his
maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neigh-
bor's."'50 As Justice Holmes expressed it, "Property is protected be-
cause such protection answers a demand of human nature, and there-
fore takes the place of a fight." 60  Thus, we have developed sys-
tems of title recording and title insurance (not to mention statutes of
limitation) in order to provide security of land ownership to allay these
otherwise deep-seated universal anxieties and, intertwined with per-
sonal ownership, satisfy the need for social stability. The United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly so recognized:
No class of laws is more universally sanctioned by the practice of nations
and the consent of mankind, than laws which give peace and confidence
to the actual possession and tiller of the soil. 61
A scheme of land regulation which ignores these deep-seated human
yearnings, and ignores or attempts to undo centuries of law developed
for their protection, risks more than individual psychoses, for toying
recklessly with such ingrained feelings calls forth automatic human re-
sponses of a type which no civilized government could desire to encour-
age.6
2
With this background in focus, let us turn to the types of regulations
which historically have been countenanced and examine the appropri-
ate paths to tread in dealing with the present reality.
58. Several hundred million years of biological evolution have altered not at all
the psychological tie between proprietor and property. Neither have those unimag-
inable epochs of evolutionary time altered the psychological stimulation which en-
hances the physiological energies of the challenged proprietor. Nor have we reason
to believe that the sense of security spreading ease through a troop of black lemurs
in their heartland has changed a least whit throughout all of primate history in its
effect on the sailor, home from the sea, or the businessman, home from the office.
R. ARDREY, THE TERmTORIAL IMPAERATVE 337 (1966).
59. Deuteronomy 5:12-17.
60. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904).
61. Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 466 (1831); see American
Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 60 (1911) ("the general welfare of society is involved
in the security of the titles to real estate"); Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 470, 477
(1831) ("[n]othing so much retards the growth and prosperity of a country as insecurity
of titles to real estate. Labor is paralyzed where the enjoyment of its fruits is uncer-
tain").
62. See notes 254-57 infra and accompanying text,
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IV. PLAYING THE LABEL GAME, OR,
"Now I SEIZE IT-Now I DoN'T"
Grown men have spilled a lot of ink trying to reassert the "primor-
dial," "outmoded,"' 4 "anachronistic" 5 and "primitive"60 proposition
that governmental entities ought to be able to do anything they please
to private property, without fear of constitutional consequences, unless
they physically seize it.17 In so doing, they have presented us with
two classic examples of semantic gamesmanship. As Chief Justice
Traynior might have put it, instead of reasoned responses, they present
us only with "magic words" which "encase notions that have never been
clemied and pressed and might disintegrate if they were."0' 8
Game No. 1: "Taking Means Physical Seizure"
As noted above, "taking" has not meant "physical seizure" for a
long time. Yet the argument is repeatedly made. The argument is
disingenuous and ignores the fundamental nature of property. Bossel-
man, Callies and Banta base their attack on a snide reference
to "Holmes' fascination with the 'Bundle of Sticks.' "09 There are sev-
eral responses.
First. Holmes was right. Property is not a "thing"; it is a group
of rights. As any elementary real estate text (indeed, in all likelihood,
any person on the street) will note, the interests that make up "prop-
erty" are frequently divided, e.g., among landlord, tenant and mort-
gage holder. Each has an interest which is property. If the underlying
real estate were condemned, each would be entitled to compensation
for the "property" taken from him.70 Again adverting to elementary
63. Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and
Prospect, 71 DicK. L. REv. 207, 210 (1967).
64. Van Arstyne, supra note 19, at 2 n.5.
65. Id.
66. Beuscher, Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the
Courts: Inverse Condemnation, in J. BEUSCHER & R. WRIGHT, LAND USE 722, 728
(1969).
67. See authorities cited in note 16 supra.
68. Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm of Reason, 7 UTAH L. REv. 157,
166 (1960). In Shakespearean terms, they are "full of sound and fury, signifying noth.
ing.'" MACBET act. V, scene 5.
6.9. Tb TA wG IssuE, supra note 16, at 240, referring to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
70. See County of San Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684, 532 P.2d 139, 119 Cal. Rptr.
491 (1975); People ex rel. Dep't Pub. Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App. 2d 870, 62
Cal. Rptr. 320 (1967). Interestingly, when the government wants to purchase less than
the full fee title, there is seen to be no problem in purchasing one or more "sticks" from
268. [Vol. 8
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precepts (and elementary textbooks), the right to use property is prob-
ably chief among the elements of property:
Property, as heretofore defined, is composed of certain constituent
elements, namely, the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal
of the particular subject of property. Of these elements the right of user
is the most essential and beneficial. Without it all other elements would
be of little effect, since if one is deprived of the use of his property,
little but a barren title is left in his hands. This right of free and un-
trammeled user for legitimate purposes is fundamental and within the
protection of the United States Constitution. 71
This thought is oft-repeated by judges,72 commentators,7 3 and legisla-
tors. 74  Whatever the semanticists want to make of it, property is a
"bundle of sticks."
Second. Why pick on Holmes? He was hardly the first to differ-
entiate among the constituent elements of property. For example, Jus-
tice Field did so.75  So did Justice McKenna. So did Justice Day.77
So did the Texas78 and California79 Supreme Courts, for that matter.
the "bundle." See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945)
(temporary taking); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hufford, 49 Cal. 2d 545, 319 P.2d 1033
(1957) (power line easement); City of Oakland v. Nutter, 13 Cal. App. 3d 752, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 347 (1970) (avigation easement).
71. 63 Am. Jur. 2d Property § 3, at 290 (1972) (emphasis added and footnotes
omitted).
72. E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945); Graves
v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383, 386 (1939); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582
(1937); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917); The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S.
548, 571 (1914) (McKenna, J., dissenting); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908); Central Pac. R.R. v. Gallatin, 99 U.S. 727, 738 (1879); Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 141 (1877); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 127
(1873) (Swayne, J., dissenting); Indian Refining Co. v. Ambraw River Drainage Dist.,
1 F. Supp. 937, 939-40 (E.D. Ill. 1932); Southern Pac. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 13
Cal. 2d 89, 117, 87 P.2d 1055, 1068-69 (1939); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman,
166 Cal. 640, 664, 137 P. 1119, 1127 (1913); McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal.
App. 2d 247, 253, 172 P.2d 758, 762 (1946).
73. E.g., Luwis ON EMmmr DomAiN § 65 (3d ed. 1909); Comment, Distinguishing
Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort, 38 WASH. L. REV. 607, 612 (1963).
74. E.g., CAL. Civ. CoDn § 654 (West 1970):
The ownership of a thing is the right of one or more persons to possess and
use it to the exclusion of others. In this Code, the thing of which there may be
ownership is called property.
(Emphasis added.)
75. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 141 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting).
76. The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 571 (1914) (MeKenna, J., dissenting).
77. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
78. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 514 (Tex. 1921).
79. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 664, 137 P. 1119, 1127 (1913).
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Likewise, numerous commentators."0 And all before Holmes wrote his
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal.
Finally. The argument thus boils down, to a semantic one: the
Super-regulators establish the erroneous premise that property is not
a group of rights, but merely a physical thing, and leap from their ipse
dixit assumption to the conclusion that, if property is only a physical
"thing," then it cannot be "taken" without being physically "seized."
But if they are wrong,81 then a "taking" of one of the sticks from the
bundle (e.g., the right to use the real estate) requires compensation
even under the taking clause of the United States Constitution.
And indeed it does. This is clear from cases such as United States
v. Causby8 2 where the Court held that a taking occurs when aircraft
flights are "so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land. 88 Clearly, it was
not physical possession which constituted the "taking" in Causby, but
the damage to the right to use the property. Similarly, in United States
v. Certain Parcels of Land,84 the Court held that rendering a high
school "ineffective and useless" because of the noise, vibrations, dirt
and filth of the nearby highway could be a "taking." In Baltimore &
P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church,85 the operation of a locomotive repair
facility which interfered with the use of a house of worship by making
excessive noise nearby was held to be a taking. And in Richards v.
Washington Terminal Co., 6 the Court found smoke and fumes from
locomotive engines operating near the subject property to be a taking
even though the owner was not wholly deprived of its use.87
This discussion is hardly exhaustive. Its purpose is simply to point
80. E.g., Luvws oN EmiNNT DoMAIN § 65 (3d ed. 1909).
81. For an exploration of changing concepts of "property," see Hecht, From Selsin
to Sit-In: Evolving Property Concepts, 44 B.U.L. REV. 435 (1964); Philbrick, Chang-
ing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691 (1938); Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.I. 733 (1964). For imaginative student efforts in articulating a
conceptual nexus between such newly formulated "property" rights and the just compen-
sation guarantee of the Constitution, see Comment, Unemployment as a Taking Without
Just Compensation, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 488 (1970); Comment, Privacy, Property,
Public Use, and Just Compensation, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 902 (1968). For recent judicial
rejection of problem "solving" by definitional means in eminent domain cases, see
County of San Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684, 532 P.2d 139, 119 Cal. Rptr. 491
(1975).
82. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
83. Id. at 266..
84. 252 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
85. 108 U.S. 317 (1883).
86. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
87. Id. at 554.
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out the intellectual bankruptcy of purporting to "solve!' the problem
with a semantic sleight of hand. Property is many things. Most ele-
ments of property can be "taken!' without physical seizure.
Game No. 2: "If I Call It Police Power, I Don't Have to Compen-
sate."
This game proceeds even further into Wonderland than the first. It
ignores the most elementary of legal maxims:
The law respects form less than substance.88
The principle has improved with age. As Justice Stewart recently re-
marked, "the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what
a State says, or by what it intends, but by what it does." 9  Nonethe-
less, otherwise respectable authorities still play the label game, assert-
ing that if "only" the "police power" is being utilized, then compensa-
tion is not required; whereas if the "eminent domain" power is used,
compensation must be paid. 0
With all the respect due it, this is the type of argument which gives
lawyers a bad name91 and inevitably summons forth fictional diatribes:
[T]he ,trouble with you, you dunder-headed fool, is that all you under-
stand is legal phrases. . . . What I'm talking about is facts, not legal-
isms.
92
What theoreticians sometimes forget is that we are not fooling around
with "Blackacre" any more. We are dealing with fundamental issues
that affect real people. And real people don't cotton to fast-talking
lawyers who play fancy word games with them and end up with title
to the family farm.
88. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3528 (West 1970).
89. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); cf.
Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 348 P.2d 664, 670-71 (Wash. 1950); Dunham, Griggs v.
Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law,
1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 63, 80-81.
90. E.g., Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
Professor Sax's 1971 views represent an unfortunate backsliding from his earlier work,
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). (For a discussion of some
problems in the earlier work, see Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 165, 178-79 (1974).) Clearly, Professor Sax has become concerned over
the sad state of the environment. See SAx, supra note 3. But in seeking solace from
the regulators, he blinds himself to what he knows are their abject failings. Compare
Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973).
91. E.g., SHAESPEARE, KING HENRY VI, Part II, act IV, scene 2: "'The first thing
we do, let's kill all the lawyers." Cf. K. VoNNEtrr, GOD BLESS You MR. RosEwATmR
(1965).
92. R. H nNI, THE PAsr TRUUGH ToMolow 375 (1967).
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But there is hope for the future.93 Some lawyers find the game-
playing distasteful. Professor Waite calls the distinction "illusory."94
Professor Michelman calls it "wordplay." 95  Professor Van Alstyne is
less restrained. He calls it "a sterile technique of circular reasoning
to describe results without explaining them."0 6
No doubt the most thorough job of eviscerating the supposed dis-
tinction between "police power" and "eminent domain" was done by
M. Reed Hunter, Esq., of San Francisco. Unfortunately, his thoughts
are available at this time only to those cognoscenti who enjoy rifling
through amicus curiae briefs in the California Supreme Court.97  Hunt-
er's thesis is that -there is, in fact, no difference at all between the "two
powers." In reality, there is but "one power with two masks." 8
There is ample factual justification for so viewing it, once we leave
the world of the semantic sophists behind. As a leading text expresses
it, "the police power is but another name for the power of the govern-
ment." 99  That statement, at first blush, may appear no more helpful
than Keats' "beauty is truth, truth beauty," which we already dismissed
as less than useful in this context. Upon reflection, however, that care-
fully considered statement'"0 may have said it all. For the whole pur-
pose of the Bill of Rights was to curb the over-zealous exercise of the
"power of government."'' 1
In fact, try though they might, neither courts nor scholars have been
able satisfactorily to distinguish between the "two powers." Professor
93. My hopes for and visions of the future are obviously not universally shared.
Compare Benson, supra note 16. With each vision, contrast G. ORWELL, 1984.
94. Waite, Governmental Power and Private Property, 16 CATH. U.L. REv. 283, 291
(1967).
95. Michelnan, supra note 14, at 1186.
96. Letter from Arvo Van Alstyne to M. Reed Hunter, Amici Curiae Brief in Support
of Plaintiffs and Respondents, at Exhibit A, HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, L.A. Nos.
30382-83 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1975).
97. Id. The HFH file also contains an excellent amici curiae brief authored by
Professors Donald Hagman of U.C.L.A. and Gideon Kanner of Loyola. The author
considers all three gentlemen personal friends, and commends them for the research
in those briefs, some of which is reflected in this article.
98. Id. at 10.
99. 1 NicaoLs, supra note 22, § 1.4217], at 1-153 (3d rev. ed. 1974); accord, Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524 (1934). For more extended discussion, see Mid-Way
Cabinet Fixture Mfg. Co. v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal. App. 2d 181, 186-87, 65
Cal. Rptr. 37, 40-41 (1967).
100. Now authored by an eminent lawyer, Julius L. Sackman, who spent more than
twenty-seven years as an Assistant Attorney General of New York, handling that State's
appellate litigation in eminent domain.
101. Notes 46-52 supra and accompanying text.
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Van Alstyne characterizes these decisions as consisting of "conclusion-
ary terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric."10 Professor
Sax calls them "a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible re-
sults. '10 3 Professor Dunham, examining only decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, found a "crazy-quilt pattern."'0 4 Professor Mi-
chelman found this area of the law "liberally salted with paradox. '" 5
(These are not the comments of untutored novices, incidentally. Pro-
fessor Hagman-no slouch himself-recently referred to these four as
"the best property/land use/local government men in the country
... ,,*"06) Professor Beuscher sagely counseled:
The inverse condemnation cases should remind us that those writers
who emphasize the separate air tight, non-overlapping character of the
two basic powers-police power and eminent domain-have been too
glib.
1 0 7
Professor Beuscher was a master of understatement. The concep-
tual difficulties which have arisen in this area are the result of a simple
refusal to face reality. Problems are not solved by attempting to de-
fine them out of existence. Problems are only solved, as W.C. Fields
once expressed it, by "taking the bull by the tail and facing the situa-
tion."
Those who have forthrightly confronted the issue have recognized
the unitary nature of the governmental power with which we deal. For
example, as the New York Court of Appeals recently stated:
Government interference with an owner's use of private property un-
der the police power runs a gamut from outright condemnation for which
compensation is expressly provided to the regulation of the general use
of land remaining in private ownership so that the use might harmonize
with other uses in the vicinity'103
The same thought appears in the most general of texts: "The power of
eminent domain may be exercised to take private property for purposes
justifiable only under the police power of the state.' 0 9
102. Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 2.
103. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 37 (1964).
104. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63, 80-81.
105. Michelman, supra note 14, at 1170.
106. Hagman, Book Review, 87 H&Rv. L. REv. 482, 486 (1973).
107. Beuscher, Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the
Courts: Inverse Condemnation, in J. BEuscmER & R. WRHT, LAND USE 724 (1969).
108. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305, 310, *359
N.Y.S.2d 7, 14 (1974).
109. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 31 (1965) (citing In re Brewster Street Housing
Site, 289 N.W. 493 (Mich. 1939)).
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The United States Supreme Court's most explicit recognition of the
concurrent nature of the "two powers" is in its 1954 decision of Berman
v. Parker.1-0 Berman, of course, is best remembered (particularly by
governmental entities) for its expansive interpretation of "public
use." '1 1  The coextensiveness of the "two powers" is best expressed
in the Court's own words:
We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the
police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits
is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition is
essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the pur-
poses of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable
of complete definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations,
when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared
in terms well-nigh conclusive. . . . It is within the power of the legis-
lature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies
have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of val-
ues. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the Dis-
trict of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful
as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
in the way.
The rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive
that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price
of the taking."12
In other situations, the courts have not only held "police power"
actions to be perfectly valid, but also held that their exercise required
compensation under the fifth amendment."
3
As a recent publication of the California Bar subtly stated, "the al-
leged distinction between exercises of the police power and the emi-
nent domain power is. . .conceptually tenuous .
110. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
111. Neither "police power" nor "eminent domain," of course, can be exercised except
for public purposes.
112. 348 U.S. at 32, 33, 36 (emphasis added).
113. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Bydlon
v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959); see Turner v. County of Del Norte,
24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 315, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96 (1972).
114. CONDEMNATION PRAcTICE IN CALIFoRNIA § 13.22, at 357 (M. Reed Hunter ed.
1973) (in the interest of candor, it must be noted that the author of the quoted section
is a senior partner in the firm with which Mr. Hunter (see notes 96-98 supra and ac-
companying text) now practices).
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The reason that the scholars have had such trouble with these cases,
and the reason that the upshot of the cases is "conceptually tenuous,"
is the obvious one. It doesn't require all the elaborate analysis and
attempts at categorization that have been made in an effort to bring
order out of chaos. All that is needed is a small dose of reality-stop
relying on labels and examine the effect of the action taken. If dam-
age is done (or if any of the "sticks" in the "bundle" are taken), then
compensation is constitutionally and morally required.
Any other result, and we might as well leave all constitutional inter-
pretations to Mr. Dooley, who makes as much sense as some present-
day philosophers:
[T]h' constitootion iv I' United States is applicable on'y in such cases
as it is applied to on account iv its applicability.
115
V. THE NOTION THAT PROPERTY COULD BE TAKEN (I.E., REGULATED
INTO WORTHLESSNESS) WITHOUT COMPENSATION AROSE IN
THE CONTEXT OF CONTROLLING Noxious USES WHICH
CAUSED ACTUAL HARM TO THE OwNERs OF
NEIGHBORING PROPERTY
It is probably time to deal with one question which has doubtless
crossed the minds of some readers by now. Clearly some land regula-
tions which virtually wipe out interests which certainly look like prop-
erty have been approved.116 If the constitutional guarantees against
confiscation are absolute,1 17 then how are these cases reconciled?
With a small amount of embarrassment, it is noted that "property"
used in such a way as to create a nuisance on neighboring lands is at-
tacked by the courts with a semantic sword. As Professor Hagman
notes: "A noxious use amounthig to a nuisance or a near-nuisance is
not considered a property right."' 1  Aside, however, from the glib,
115. F. DUNNE, MR. DooLEY ON Tim CHoicn OF LAW xxi (E. Bander ed. 1968).
116. E.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 US. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Consolidated Rock Prods. v. City
of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
117. Clearly, none of the constitutional guarantees of the sanctity of private property
carries any facial limitations.
118. D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON & C. MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONIN*G PRACTICE § 3.12, at
52 (C.E.B. 1969). This theory, of course, is neither bereft of practical and conceptual
problems nor of vocal and literate critics. See Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking
Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165, 174-75 (1974). Candidly, I would be a lot happier
if the courts just stopped playing this type of game. Nonetheless, it continues. Off-
hand, in other fields, one notes that pornography is not protected by the Constitution
because it is not protected speech (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957))
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definitional answer to the question, there is some substance. The law
has always frowned on nuisances and cursed them with latin phrases.'" 9
From earliest times, man has been compelled to refrain from making
uses of his property which cause injury to his neighbors. Thus, Cali-
fornia defines a nuisance as follows:
Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to inter-
fere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any nav-
igable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park,
square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.
120
A nuisance may be prosecuted both civilly12' and criminally.
22
This disfavoring of noxious uses led to a long series of cases holding
that no one may prescriptively acquire the right to maintain a nuisance,
even though other types of usage may so give rise to a servitude.'
2
For example, in Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons,124 the defendant had
operated its nuisance-producing pottery factory for seventeen years be-
fore plaintiff bought the adjoining property and for forty years before
trial. The California Supreme Court refused even to consider the ar-
gument that this length of time either gave defendant the right to con-
tinue the nuisance or barred plaintiff from court.
This line of authority is simply one manifestation of the demise of
the discredited doctrine that he who "comes to a nuisance" must grin
and that a fetus is not protected by the Constitution because it is not a person (Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973)). This comment is not intended to reflect my opinion
on the ultimate decision reached by the Court in any of these matters. But there must
be a more honest way of getting there than by defining the issue out of existence.
119. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own property in such a manner
as not to injure that of another). See generally 6A AMERIcAN LAW oF PRoPERTY 64-
98 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954); Berger, The California Supreme Court-A Shield Against
Governmental Overreaching: Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 9 CALIF. W.L. REV. 199,
205-211 (1973); Fadem & Berger, A Noisy Airport is A Damned Nuisance!, 3 Sw. U.L.
Rnv. 39 (1971). For a recent discussion of the relation between zoning and nuisance,
see CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306,
318-19, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 324-25 (1974).
120. CAL. Cv. CODE § 3479 (West 1970).
121. Id. §§ 3491-95, 3501-02.
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 372 (West 1972).
123. E.g., Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 937, 496 P.2d 480, 492,
101 Cal. Rptr. 568, 580 (1972); Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 216 Cal. 156, 164, 13
P.2d 733, 737 (1932); Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 750-53, 218 P. 753, 755-56
(1923); Smallpage v. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 538, 541-42, 79 P.2d
752 (1938); Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co., 85 Cal. App. 388, 395-96, 259 P. 484,
487 (1927).
124. 216 Cal. 156, 13 P.2d 733 (1932).
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and bear it. That doctrine was moribund so long ago that, in 1927,
the court could proclaim in Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co. 125 that
"the doctrine of coming to a nuisance was long ago exploded.' 12  As
the California Supreme Court has crisply noted:
The fact that a business was established in the open country remote
from habitations will not defeat a proceeding for the maintenance of a
nuisance after the land in its vicinity has been built up and occupied;
such business must give way to the rights of the public, and when build-
ings and habitations approach the place of its location means must be
devised to avoid the nuisance, or it must be removed or stopped.'
27
In Hadacheck v. Sebastian,28 the City of Los Angeles tried to elim-
inate a brickyard which had become a nuisance to its late-blooming
residential neighbors. 12 9 The brickyard owner vigorously defended his
rights on the basis of his prior occupation. The United States Supreme
Court rejected his argument:
A vested interest cannot be asserted against it because of conditions
once obtaining. To so hold would preclude development and fix a city
forever in its primitive conditions . . . . The logical result of peti-
tioner's contention would seem to be that a city could not be formed
or enlarged against the resistance of an occupant of the ground and that
if it grows at all it can only grow as the environment of the occupations
that are usually banished to the purlieus.13
0
In the context of this long-standing abhorrence for noxious uses of
property, the first "taking by regulation" cases arrived in the courts.
Thus, in Hadacheck, the Court upheld an ordinance compelling the
shutdown of brickyards in residential areas because they constituted a
nuisance to the neighbors.' 3 ' And in Miller v. Schoene,8 2 trees af-
flicted with cedar rust,, a disease which threatened the destruction of
nearby apple orchards, were ordered destroyed under authority of a
state anti-nuisance act. Likewise, in Reinman v. City of Little Rock,
88
125. 85 Cal. App. 388, 259 P. 484 (1927).
126. Id. at 392, 259 P. at 487.
127. Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 369-70, 18 P.2d 678, 680-81 (1933), quoting with
approval People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 46 N.W. 735 (Mich. 1890).
128. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
129. See Ex parte Hadacheck, 165 Cal. 416, 418, 132 P. 584, 585 (1913), affd sub
nom. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
130. 239 U.S. at 410.
131. Id. at 409-10.
132. 276 U.S. 272 (1928); accord, Coelho v. Truckell, 9 Cal. App. 2d 47, 48 P.2d
697 (1935) (no compensation for destruction of diseased cattle).
133. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
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an ordinance requiring the removal of a livery stable from a densely
populated part of town was upheld.
The point will not be bludgeoned further, as virtually all agree that
the classic cases upholding the right to regulate property into worthless-
ness were based upon findings that the use made (and to be forbidden
in the future) was a noxious one.'84 The point is that the police power-
noxious use cases boil down to a pragmatic principle which can be
stated by example: it may be a man's good fortune to discover that
his land is sitting on a pool of oil; but that hardly confers upon him
the unbridled right to erect an oil derrick and unleash a gusher in the
middle of a bedroom community. His activity would impinge on the
rights of his neighbors.'85 Hence, by regulation, the zoning entity may
forbid him to do so in order to protect the health, safety and welfare
of that community. It is an altogether different story when the govern-
ment seeks to excessively regulate a lawful innocuous activity posing no
threat to the health and safety of the community. To continue in the
vein of the above hypothetical example, it would be a different matter
altogether if the zoning entity-in the name of its police power-said
to an owner of a residential lot in that bedroom community, "You may
not build a home on your lot, or do anything else with it except to main-
tain it as a green spot for the enjoyment of the community (and while
you're at it, don't forget to pay your taxes on that lot)."'u 6 In sum,
regulation can protect the public from injurious acts of individuals; it
134. E.g., FRE ND, Tim POLICE POWER § 511 (1904); D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON & C.
MARTiN, CALwoRlu ZONIG PRACTICE § 3.12, at 52 (C.E.B. 1969); Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 39 (1964).
A recent and perverse mutation of this principle appears in Just v. Marinette County,
201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). There, an ordinance prohibited the filling of land within
1000 feet of navigable lakes without a permit. Instead of examining the effect of the
regulation on the owner (as I would argue is constitutionally required), the court
stooped to semantic sophistry. Adverting to the classic noxious use cases, the court said
that the restriction was not serving a benefit for the public, but preventing a harm. Un-
fortunately, that sort of reasoning is the same sort of circular, conclusionary, confusing,
paradoxical "logic?' noted earlier (see notes 99-102 supra and accompanying text). It
is no help at all in providing guidance for the future. If that is the rationale, a differ-
ent group of judges could apply precisely that rule to the same facts and arrive at pre-
cisely the opposite result. Indeed, shortly after Just, the same court decided KMIEC
v. Town of Spider Lake, 211 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1973), in which another lakeshore zon-
ing ordinance was held unconstitutional.
135. Compare Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 333, 270 P. 952, 954-
55 (1928), with Pacific Palisades Ass'n v. City of Huntington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 237
P. 538 (1925).
136. See Michelman, Toward a Practical Standard for Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PIAc.
LAW., Feb., 1969, at 36, 38.
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is not a device whereby the public can take an individual's lawful prop-
erty.
VI. By UNIFORMLY SETTLED LAW, ZONING WHICH DEPRIVEs THE
LANDOWNER OF ALL REASONABLE USE OF HIS PROPERTY IS
DEEMED CONFISCATORY AND HENCE CONSTITUTES A
"TAKING." SUCH ZONING GIVES RISE TO
RELIEF BY INVERSE CONDEMNATION
The principle stated in the above heading rests on so large a body
of decisional law that it would be unduly burdensome (and perhaps
cruel and unusual punishment) to recount all of it here. Treatises not
only can be, but also have been written on the subject, and they make
it clear that such authority is overwhelming.
137
However, since we appear to have entered an era when some quan-
dam scholars are urging that the whole idea of protecting private prop-
erty is a "myth,"' 38 and others urge the "discard[ing] [of] the taking
myth in order to allow the new land use control systems to work effec-
tively,"'139 perhaps it is well to dwell momentarily on the development
of the law of inverse condemnation and its relation to over-zealous zon-
ing.
A. Federal Cases
The United States Supreme Court has refused to sully its hands with
zoning cases on anything resembling a regular basis. Thus, we are left
with a handful of decisions from which to divine the law. No time
need be spent analyzing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
140
Everyone knows that in Euclid the concept of zoning withstood a gen-
eral challenge based on the "taking" clause. But two things deserve
note. First, the exercise of the police power to divide a city into zones
was expressly related to the power to control nuisances.' 4' Second,
the Supreme Court was careful to note that while the concept of zoning
in general was not unconstitutional, zoning as applied to specific prop-
137. E.g., C. RATHKOPF & A. RATnKOPF, THm LAw OF ZONING ANi) PLANNING (3d ed.
1972) which devotes an entire chapter to the topic: "Ordinance Invalid If Confiscatory"
(Vol. 1, ch. 6). See numerous authorities collected in Sackman, The Impact of Zoning
and Eminent Domain Upon Each Other, in SoUrHWEsTERN LGAL FOUNDATION INSTI-
TUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOm.iN 107, 109-10 (1971).
138. THE TAKING Isstu, supra note 16, passim.
139. Benson, supra note 16, at 655.
140. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
141. Id. at 387-88; compare notes 116-36 supra and accompanying text.
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erty might not pass the constitutional matrix.1"2
Euclid was followed almost immediately by Nectow v. Cambridge.4 '
In Nectow, the property owner accepted the invitation held out in Eu-
clid to challenge the effect of a comprehensive zoning ordinance on
his particular property. The subject property was zoned residential.
It was bordered by a Ford Motor Company factory and near the Boston
and Albany Railroad tracks. A special master found that "'no prac-
tical use can be made of the land in question for residential purposes
... , ,,144 The Supreme Court held the zoning confiscatory and vio-
lative of the fourteenth amendment. 45 Similarly, in that same forma-
tive period, in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,140
the Court, in striking down a zoning ordinance that delegated too much
control to people living within the zones, reiterated:
Legislatures may not, under the guise of the police power, impose re-
strictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the use of private
property or the pursuit of useful activities.147
The Court's two most recent zoning decisons, Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead'48 and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,149 upholding the
questioned zoning, offer little assistance. In Goldblatt, land containing
a long-used sand and gravel pit, which had become completely sur-
rounded by residential use, was regulated so as to prevent excavation
below the water table and to compel filling of any such excavation
heretofore made. Although the ordinance was challenged as a taking
of property, 50 there was "no evidence in the . . .record which even
remotely suggest[ed] that prohibition of further mining [would] reduce
the value of the lot in question."'' Thus, while the challenge was made,
it was apparently unsupported.. The Court referred to the noxious use
cases discussed earlier as well as to the cases holding that severe restric-
tion could, if proved, be a compensable taking.15 2  In Boraas, no chal-
lenge under the taking clause was made, 153 and the property owners
142. 272 U.S. at 395-97.
143. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
144. Id. at 187.
145. Id. at 188-89.
146. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
147. Id. at 121 (citing numerous authorities).
148. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
149. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
150. 369 U.S. at 592.
151. Id. at 594.
152. Id. at 592-94.
153. 416 U.S. at 7.
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conceded that they faced no "economic loss."'1 54
While the Supreme Court has remained essentially aloof from the
problems under consideration here, the lower federal courts have been
asked to take (and have taken) an active role. Governmental defend-
ants have consistently argued in numerous cases that no relief could
be granted because all that was involved was an exercise of the "police
power."'155 The courts lost no time in dismissing this argument and
letting it be known that some exercises of the "police power" may be
invalid unless accompanied by compensation.
B. California Cases
California law, not surprisingly, has developed in much the same way
as federal law. Indeed, contemporaneously with Euclid, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court approved the concept of zoning, 156 and the United
States Supreme Court affirmed.' 57  The California Supreme Court, as
had the United States Supreme Court, noted immediately thereafter that
there were limits to the zoning power. In Pacific Palisades Associa-
tion v. City of Huntington Beach,"" the subject property was zoned
residential, even though the property was in a proven oil producing re-
gion and nearby properties were developed for such production. The
supreme court refused to accept the "mere regulation" defense:
We are of the opinion that the appellant has stated a cause of action.
The business of boring for and producing oil is a lawful enterprise. The
effect of the ordinance, absolutely prohibiting the maintenance or opera-
154. Id. at 11.
155. Dahli v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that
rezoning residential property from one acre minimum lots to ten acre minimum lots
could be an unconstitutional taking); Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Vazquez, 354 F. Supp. 1355
(D.P.R. 1972) (holding that the refusal to grant a permit for sand extraction could be
an improper taking); Immobiliaria Borinquen, Inc. v. Garcia Santiago, 295 F. Supp. 203
(D.P.R. 1969) (holding that an attempt to freeze development in anticipation of future
acquisition could be an unconstitutional taking); Shelburne, Inc. v. New Castle County,
293 F. Supp. 237 (D. Del. 1968) (holding that a rezoning from commercial to residen-
tial, resulting in an alleged diminution in value of at least $200,000, could be an uncon-
stitutional taking); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970)
(a series of governmental actions designed to bar development of property which the
United States eventually wanted to acquire for the Point Reyes National Seashore, was,
on the facts as proved, a taking of property); Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp.
891 (CL Cl. 1959) (regulation which banned air access to remote property was a
taking which required compensation).
156. Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388 (1925), affd, 274 U.S.
325 (1927).
157. Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
158. 196 Cal. 211, 237 P. 538 (1925).
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tion of oil wells within certain designated limits of the City of Hunting-
ton Beach, is to deprive the owners of real property within such limits
of a valuable right incident to their ownership. While the use to which
one may put his property may be restricted or regulated by the state,
in the exercise of its police power, so far as it may be necessary to pro-
tect others from injury from such use, it is elementary that the enjoy-
ment of the property cannot be interfered with or limited arbitrarily.'8 0
For the next fifteen years, little of note occurred, as local govern-
ments experimented with the newly-approved comprehensive zoning
power."" In the late 1930's, the supreme court issued two important
decisions-Reynolds v. Barrett""' and Skalko v. City of Sunnyvale."0 2
In Reynolds, the City of Piedmont zoned the owner's land for resi-
dential use even though it was surrounded by commercial uses. This
could not be legally done:
[R]easonable minds cannot differ as to the arbitrary and discriminatory
nature of the ordinance as applied to the particular parcel here involved.
Obviously, a city purporting to act under its police power, cannot create
a business district, and entirely within it create an "island" of one lot
restricted to residential purposes when no rational reason exists for such
a classification. Clearly, and without possibility of doubt, such classifi-
cation is discriminatory as to the isolated parcel, completely surrounded
by business property. That is exactly the situation here presented.' 08
In Skalko, the zoning ordinance restricted the owner's land to resi-
dential uses even though it was utterly unsuited to such use. The prop-
erty was adjacent to a cannery which at times worked around the clock,
159. Id. at 216, 237 P. at 539. Note again the emphasis on the control of noxious
use inherent in the approval of the zoning.
160. Except for occasional abberations, such as Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal.
304, 295 P. 14 (1930), in which the court refused to permit retroactive application of
a residential zoning ordinance in such a way as to force closure of pre-existing sanitari-
ulns
161. 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83 P.2d 29 (1938).
162. 14 Cal. 2d 213, 93 P.2d 93 (1939).
163. 12 Cal. 2d at 251, 83 P.2d at 33. The supreme court again adverted to the
question whether the proposed use of the property would be injurious to its neighbors:
Obviously the property is valueless for a single family residence, and while that
fact is not by itself conclusive, when it also appears that the property at no point
is adjacent to residential property so that its use for business purposes would not
at all adversely affect residential property, the business use should be permitted. To
hold otherwise would be to needlessly injure plaintiffs, without a compensating ben-
efit to the public.
Id. at 250, 83 P.2d at 33; accord, La Salle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 145 N.E.2d
65 (II. 1957); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1938); State
ex reL Tingley v. Gurda, 243 N.W. 317 (Wis. 1932); see Pera v. Village of Shorewood,
186 N.W. 623 (Wis. 1922) (ordinance zoning land residential although surrounded by
commercial upheld, but case returned to trial court to compensate owner).
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subjecting nearby land to noise, traffic, and insects emanating from
the cannery. The property simply could not be put to residential uses-
its residential zoning notwithstanding-because no one would live next
to a cannery. Noting the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Nectow and Roberge, the court wasted little time in holding the ordi-
nance oppressive and unreasonable.
In 1950, the supreme court reaffirmed its adherence to the rule of
reason as well as to the concept of a nexus between zoning and noxious
uses. In City of Beverly Hills v. Brady,6 " the city brought an action
to enjoin a writer's use of his R-1 zoned home for some of his activi-
ties involving very extensive correspondence with his readers. The
trial court denied an injunction, and the supreme court affirmed, hold-
ing that Dr. Brady's reasonable use of his home was lawful and inoffen-
sive to the community and hence could not be 15rohibited. 165 Since
Dr. Brady's use of his home for his writing did not interfere with or
threaten any of the objects of the regulatory scheme (i.e., preservation
of public health, safety or welfare), it could not be forbidden under
the police power.166
The decade beginning in 1958 was an active and instructive one.
During that period, the courts struck down a down-zoning designed to
reduce the value of the property before city acquisition,16 7 invalidated
a set-back ordinance which reduced the available building area to a
parcel 'adapted to nothing more than a large size doll house,"'168 over-
turned a height limitation ordinance in the approach zone to an airport
on the ground that a flight easement should have been purchased,169
164. 34 Cal. 2d 854, 215 P.2d 460 (1950).
165. Id. at 857-58,-215 P.2d at 462.
166. In the court's words, "Application of zoning restrictions to particular facts is
subject to investigation by the courts and each case is determinable on its individual
merits." Id. at 857, 215 P.2d at 462.
167. Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958)
(R-3 [apartments] to R-1 [single family]); accord, City of Plainfield v. Borough of
Middlesex, 173 A.2d 785 (N.J. Super. CL 1961) (property zoned for parks, play-
grounds and schools; held: confiscatory, oppressive and invalid); Sackman, The Im-
pact of Zoning and Eminent Domain Upon Each Other, in SouTrHwE=smN LEGAL
FOumDATION INsTrrTU oN PLANmNG, ZomNG ANn EimsNm DoMan 107, 118 (1971).
168. Hoshour v. County of Contra Costa, 203 Cal. App. 2d 602, 603, 21 Cal. Rptr.
714, 715 (1962). As the court put it, "Nothing was left to them but bare ownership
and the burden of taxation." Id. at 604, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 715; accord, Faucher v. Sher-
wood, 32 N.W.2d 440 (Mich. 1948); Householder v. Town of Grand Island, 114 N.Y.S.
2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1951), affd, 113 N.E.2d 555 (1953) (90 foot setback invalid).
169. Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963);
accord, Indiana Toll Road Comm'n v. Jankovich, 193 N.E.2d 237 (Ind.), cert. dis-
missed, 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
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nullified a one acre minimum lot size requirement in an area built-up
with smaller lots, 17 0 refused to permit forced dedication of land for a
county street construction project as a condition to granting a use per-
mit (the project not being required by the proposed development)1
7 1
and held that an extended freeze on any type of development while
the government decided whether it wished to acquire property was a
taking.'
72
Finally, as the age of extreme environmental concern burst upon us,
the supreme court, in Kopping v. City of Whittier, 78 noted that "a
particularly harsh zoning regulation ' 174 could give rise to an inverse
condemnation action.
VII. CAN THE "POLICE PowER" BE UNRESTRAMNEDLY USED
TO "MAKE THE WORLD SAFE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT"?'
75
OR
HAVE SOME PEOPLE FORGOTTEN THAT THE STATE'S POLICE
POWER IS NOT (YET) TEE POWER OF A POLICE STATE?
Having individually examined a number of threads in our national
background (legal, cultural and anthropological), we arrive at the dec-
170. Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335
(1963). In the words of Justice Tobriner:
In reality we contemplate here an isolated area that has become an "island" of
one-acre minimum lot size zoning in a residential ocean of substantially less restric-
tive zoning.
Id. at 782, 382 P.2d at 379, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
171. Mid-way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. Co. v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal. App.
2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967).
172. Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391
(1969); accord, State v. Griggs, 358 P.2d 174 Ariz. 1960) (statute allowing the state two
years after passage of condemnation resolution to decide whether it wanted the property
and valuing property as of issuance of summons held unconstitutional); Lomareh Corp.
v. Mayor & Common Council, 237 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1968) (statute permitting city to
designate property on official maps as "park" for one year construed to be option to
purchase; case returned to trial court to determine cost of one year option to purchase);
Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 82 A.2d 34 (Pa. 1951) (ordinance designating 4% acres
as a park and giving city three years to decide whether to buy the land was invalid).
173. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
174. Id. at 46, 500 P.2d at 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 7. This thought was recently
reiterated in Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal.
3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974): "The primary constitutional concern
is that as applied to a particular land parcel, a zoning regulation might constitute a
compensable 'taking' of property." Id. at 511 n.4, 522 P.2d at 14 n.4, 113 Cal. Rptr. at
838 n.4.
175. With apologies to Professor Irving Kristol, who concluded an excellent overview
of environmental issues by noting: "Making the world safe for the environment is not
the same thing as making the environment safe for our world." Kristol, The Environ-
mentalist Crusade, Wall Street J., Dec. 16, 1974, at 12, col. 4 & 6.
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ade of the 1970's-the time of environmental concern; the time of sud-
den awakening to how we have blindly sinned in the past; the time
when all right-thinking liberals should be joining ranks behind the zon-
ing zealots and urging that the world stop while we study the situation
for a while.17
6
But is that actually where we are? Can the situation honestly, if
simplistically, be forced into a "good guy environmentalist" versus "bad
guy developer" mold? Isn't the real intellectual/psychological/gut-
wrenching problem caused by the fact that we cannot simply view it as
a "good guy-bad guy" problem? When a city zones an area for large
lots, or seeks to exclude apartments, is it preserving the environment?177
Or is it discriminating against the poor?17 8
After being in the forefront of the "environmental" movement to
slow development and zone for large lots and open spaces, many lib-
erals came uncomfortably face-to-face with this other edge of the sword
they had so lustily wielded. One supposes that it all really hit the fan
for them in Petaluma, California. Petaluma is a small, northern Cali-
fornia town in the path of San Francisco's suburban expansion. Con-
cerned about its growth rate, Petaluma, in 1971, adopted a plan where-
by only 500 home building permits could be issued annually for the
next five years, roughly half its then-current growth rate.179  The area
north of San Francisco is some of the loveliest country around, and we
would have thought that "liberals" would hail the plan for its environ-
mental rightness. When the plan was challenged in court, however,
the key witness for the developers, economist Claude Gruen (usually
associated with liberal, environmentally oriented issues), explained:
176. Studying problems to death is another American mania. But its use is not re-
stricted to "good guys" who are honestly searching for solutions--though their innocent
delays sometimes cause injury (see, e.g., Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal.
App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969)). For the use (or abuse) sometimes made by
the "black hats," see RODGERS, supra note 3.
177. E.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
178. E.g., Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974);
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.
1970); Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance, 37 Cal. App. 3d 830, 112 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1974); G & D Holland Constr. Co. v. City of Marysville, 12 Cal. App. 3d 989, 91
Cal. Rptr. 227 (1970).
The decision of In re Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970),
probably best illustrates the ideological division. In a 4-3 decision, large-lot (2 acre)
zoning was invalidated: three justices thought the ordinance exclusionary, one thought
the zoning was generally unconstitutional, and the remaining three thought planning was
a good idea.
179. The plan is discussed in detail in Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma,
375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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"[Tihe social implications of this case could tear up the fabric of the
Republic" .... The people of Petaluma "were waging class warfare;
they didn't want people who live in tract housing to come in and share
their city services."'180
An extensive discussion of the exclusionary zoning controversy 1 ' is
obviously beyond the scope of this article.'82  The very existence of
the issue, however, should help to indicate that there is not necessarily
a "right" or "wrong" result in cases dealing with restriction of land
use-it depends on whose pet ox ends up turning on the spit. Thus,
I would urge that when we view the legality of land regulation, we do
so in light of the enduring constitutional principles for which this Na-
tion has long struggled. Too many of those who urged concentration
of executive power under Roosevelt and Kennedy found to their horror
under Nixon 8' that such power could be abused.' 84  The task, then,
180. Lawson, Civil Libertarians loin Developers to Oppose Cities' Growth Curbs,
Wall Street J., Jan. 31, 1975, at 16, col. 1-2. Indeed, as one resident put it, "Petaluma
had decided to 'pull up the ladder. The city hereafter was for the people already on
board.'" Id. at 1, col. 1.
181. Speaking of definitional game-playing, did you notice how it's "exclusionary zon-
ing" when restrictive land regulation is viewed as keeping out the urban poor, and "envi-
ronmentally sound land management" otherwise?
182. For a good discussion, see, e.g., FAin HOUSING AND EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE
(National Commission Against Discrimination in Housing & Urban Land Institute
1974); Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning of
the End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9; Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rav. 767 (1969). Of particular interest
is Freilich & Bass, Exclusionary Zoning: Suggested Litigation Approaches, 3 URBAN
LAW. 344 (1972). Professor Freilich is the architect of the.Ramapo "phased growth"
plan (approved in Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972)). While Professor Freilich stoutly denies that the
Ramapo plan is "exclusionary" (Freilich, Current Developments in Local Government
Law, 6 URBAN LAw. 288, 312 (1974)), and notes that in fact, under the plan, low in-
come housing is being built in Ramapo (Freilich, Editor's Comments, 4 URBAN LAW.,
Summer, 1972, at xiii) others opine that maybe it was just "clever enough" to pass
judicial scrutiny (see Lawson, Civil Libertarians loin Developers to Oppose Cities'
Growth Curbs, Wall Street J., Jan. 31, 1975, at 16, col. 2). Or maybe it's a good tool
as utilized by Professor Freilich and the present administration of Ramapo, but there
is concern about the way the method could be used by less enlightened planners.
183. See generally THm Wrra HoUSE TRNscRnyrs (1974).
184. In the planning and zoning context, Professor Williams' decade-and-a-half old
comments still ring true:
In looking at planning law, we should not depend too heavily on the idealized
image of public regulation by legislators or administrators-the image of the liberal
intellectual, with considerable freedom from political pressures, applying his exper-
ise first to develop an overall public policy and then to devise legal means for its
implementation. This must not be simply laughed off: it can happen, and does,
probably with increasing frequency. But this is far from the whole story. We are
not dealing with federal agencies having experienced and competent professional
staffs. Even now, it is difficult to argue that most "planning controls" are based
upon anything that could remotely be called comprehensive planning. Moreover,
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is to ensure that the power is under control, so that it may be benignly
wielded regardless of the helmsman.'"
What about the recent environmental-regulatory decisions? Some
see a "revolution" in judicial thought going on, either quietly,8 6 or not
so quietly.' 87 I demur.
The California courts have been fairly quiescent of late. This may
not be entirely their fault. After all, they are not "self-starters"; they
can only decide cases that are brought -to them.'8 8  Whether this means
that California's regulators are being reasonable, or that the cases are
too recent and still in the pipeline is open to speculation. It is probably
a little of each. 8 9
exclusionism and favoritism are rife in the field, and sheer muddleheadedness is
even more so. The planning policies adopted by some communities run directly
contrary to basic democratic rights and values. The actions of local authorities
(legislative bodies, planning and zoning commissions, boards of appeal, etc.) some-
times simply ignore the supposedly controlling rules of law as if they didn't exist-
and may descend to pure political favoritism. Moreover, what looks like a sinister
conspiracy is quite likely, on closer inspection, to turn out to be sheer confusion.
The amount of confusion is often appalling; for example, small towns, and occa-
sionally even large cities, sometimes do not even have a readable copy of their zon-
ing map. As a result of this, there are many examples of purely arbitrary govern-
mental action-leaving land in private ownership, subject to taxes, and yet prevent-
ing any reasonable use of it, or imposing severe burdens on its use for no visible
reason. This may be the result of public authorities yielding to political pressure;
quite as often it comes from pure stupidity, undiluted by baser motives.
Williams, Planning Law and the Supreme Court: 1, 13 ZONING DIGEST 57 (1961), re-
printed in D. MtANLKER, MANAGING OuR URBAN ENviRONMENT 485-86 (1966); cf. 1 K.
DAvis, ADMmiSrRATIvE LAw TEATsE § 1.05, at 34 (1958).
185. See generally Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884); Loan Assn. v.
Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662 (1874); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
119 (1866); Wright, supra note 42, at 1266. Compare Freilich, Editor's Comments, 4
URBAN LAw., Summer, 1972, at xiv:
All zoning and planning toolsare essentially neutral. They can be used correctly
or incorrectly depending upon the motivation of the regulators. Our efforts must
be to eliminate the abuses, while simultaneously developing stronger efforts to pre-
serve the quality of our communities and of the environment and to assure eco-
nomic and racial equality in planning not without planning.
My only dispute with Professor Freilich-since we both agree that the tools them-
selves are neutral-boils down to my belief in relatively simple tools, which any ignora-
mus can properly apply, rather than the development of complex mechanisms which can
be innocently misused by those who don't know any better as well as malevolently
wielded by closet Caesars.
186. THm TAKING IssuE, supra note 16, at 212.
187. Benson, supra note 16, at 660.
188. Unless, of course, the Courts of Appeal have been burying their decisions under
California's quaint Rule 976-which permits selective publication by the Court of Ap-
peal-and Rule 977-which forbids the citation of unpublished decisions. Some lawyers
aren't wild about that idea. See generally Kanner, The Unpublished Appellate Opinion:
Friend or Foe?, 48 CALIF. ST. B.J. 386 (1973); Lascher, Lascher at Large, 50 CALIF.
ST. B.J. 36, 38-39 (1975). But that's another story for another day.
189. The author is presently involved in several such cases, but all are still in the
pre-appellate decision stages.
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Three significant decisions affecting the coastline have been ren-
dered. Their significance, however, is often overblown by over-eager
government lawyers, for none of the appellate courts reviewed the mer-
its of a contested trial, and all based their holdings that no unconstitu-
tional taking had occurred on the limited, study-period nature of the
restrictions.
The California Supreme Court's only contribution is one of those
anonymous things entitled State v. Superior Court (Veta).190 The Veta
Company sought a permit from the California Coastal Zone Conserva-
tion Commission' 91 to develop its property.19 2 The Regional Commis-
sion granted the permit. The State Commission, however, denied the
permit on appeal. 193 Veta then filed suit seeking to overturn the denial
and, alternatively, seeking inverse condemnation damages of $14,777,-
987.194 The case reached the supreme court on a pleading matter,
the trial court having overruled the Commission's demurrers and the
Commission having sought instant review by extraordinary writ rather
than risking trial. The supreme court held that the demurrer to the
inverse condemnation cause of action should have been sustained. But
for our purposes, its reasons are more important than its result. No
fewer than five times in less than two pages, the court emphasized that
the permit control being contested was temporary' 95 and would cease
to exist, by the terms of the statute,' 90 in 1976.19 Thus, the court
190. 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974).
191. A personal note. The Coast Commission (referring here jointly to the state
commission and the six regional commissions (see CAL. Put. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 27200,
27201 (West Supp. 1975)) is the proverbial Exhibit "A" of everything that can be
wrong with the administrative process. This is not said, incidentally, because I am. a
property owners' lawyer and the Coast Commission has halted all development along
the coast. On the contrary, the Commission is authorized to issue development permits
(d. § 27400) and proudly notes that the vast majority of applications are granted
(see, e.g., CALIF. COASTAL ZoNE CONSERVATION COMM'N, 1973 ANNuAL REPORT 7).
Nor is it said by one who opposed the initiative measure which created the Coast Com-
mission-I voted for it. It is said because the Commissions display-almost proudly-
such an utter disregard for elementary due process, equal treatment and simple con-
sideration for people that it is astounding. Don't take my word for it. Spend a couple
of hours at a permit hearing-with an open mind. You will hear lots of applications.
Judge for yourself.
192. CAL. Pu. REs. CODE ANN. § 27400 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
193. Id. § 27423.
194. The supreme court's opinion gives no clue as to either the location of the project
(other than that it was either in Los Angeles County or Orange County) or the nature
of the project.
195. 12 Cal. 3d at 253-55, 524 P.2d at 1292-93, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09.
196. CAL. Pun. REs. CODE ANN. § 27650 (West Supp. 1975).
197. 12 Cal. 3d at 253, 524 P.2d at 1291-92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 507-08,
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concluded that the "denial of a building permit. does not amount
at this time to a taking of property for public use without compensa-
tion." 9
8
That significant inverse condemnation liability could result after
1976, as alluded to by the court, was expressly told to the voters when
they enacted this legislation by initiative. The voter's pamphlet dis-
tributed to each registered voter in the state noted:
The state plan must propose reservation of land or water in the coastal
zone for certain uses or prohibition of certain uses. The acquisition of
such land would probably be necessary but would require additional leg-
islation. However, stringent application of the permit processes could
result in unknown damages from inverse condemnation suits on lands
not acquired.199
The court of appeal recently upheld the general constitutionality of
the Coast Act relying on Veta and the interim nature of the permit
controls.2 00 No specific project was in issue.
Finally, in Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conser-
vation & Development Commission,"0' the court of appeal examined
what could be called a precursor of the State Coast Act which involved
interim permit control over San Francisco Bay. 202 In Candlestick
Properties, the Commission denied a permit to fill a parcel of property
which was covered by the waters of the Bay at high tide. The refusal
was upheld by the courts. The inverse condemnation claim was thrown
out, however, because of the interim nature of the controls pending de-
velopment of an overall plan for the Bay.203  The court recognized,
198. id. at 255, 524 P.2d at 1293, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 509 (emphasis added).
199. STATE Op CAI.u'oRNIA, PROPOSED AmNDmENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, PROPOSI-
TIONS AND PROPOSED LAws 52 (1972). Elections Code Section 3566 requires the State's
Legislative Analyst to prepare an impartial financial analysis of each ballot measure.
200. CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306,
313-14, 316, 324, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320-21, 322, 328 (1974).
201. 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970).
202. The similarities are briefly discussed in Jackson & Baum, Regional Planning:
The Coastal Zone Initiative Analyzed in Light of the BCDC Experience, 47 CALIF.
ST. B.J. 426 (1972).
203. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 571-72, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06. Even under the famous
(or infamous) Ramapo plan (Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (see note 182 supra)) the court placed
heavy and repeated emphasis on what it viewed as the temporary nature of the restric-
tions. Before uncritical expansion of the Ramapo plan is attempted by less-skilled archi-
tects, note should be taken of the following factors considered important by the New
York Court of Appeals in Golden: (1) the restriction was temporary; (2) the restriction
forbade intensive development, not all useful development; (3) while those protesting the
plan claimed that property values were grossly affected, they offered no proof on the
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however (relying on two'east coast cases that will be subsequently dis-
cussed), that an undue restriction which left only public uses would be
a taking.
204
The California Supreme Court's most recent foray into zoning
reached- no issues of concern here. In two companion cases, 205 the
court simply decided that zoning by initiative is not unconstitutional,
without reaching the merits of either measure as applied to specific
property.
The upshot is that the law applied to "environmental regula-
tion" cases in California has so far been no different from the law ap-
plied -to other regulations, which is reassuring more than surprising.
Looking at the United States as a whole, however, the pattern is not
consistent.206
Bosselman, Callies and Banta discuss a number of cases in
which they detect a change.207  To the extent they rely on California
authorities, they overstate.20 8 Cases from other states which they ei-
ther downplay or fail to mention show no haste to abandon basic val-
ues. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to allow
the use of the police power to maintain wetlands property for
flood plain and recreational purposes, stating:
These are laudable public purposes and we do not doubt the high-
mindedness of their motivation. But such factors cannot cure basic un-
constitutionality .... Both public uses are necessarily so all-encom-
passing as practically to prevent the exercise by a private owner of any
worthwhile rights or benefits in the land. So public acquisition rather
than regulation is required.
20 9
The following year, the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated
a flood plain zoning which limited uses to recreation, farming and wild-
issue; (4) the key to the plan was Ramapo's claim that municipal facilities were inade-
quate for intensive growth, and that claim was not contested. Id. at 295-304, 334 N.Y.S.
2d at 143-56. Compare other cases, where the "lack of facilities" argument was con-
tested. E.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965).
204. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 906; cf. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town
of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 962 (1st Cir. 1972) (large-lot zoning unhappily approved
because it appeared to be an interim, study measure; if not interim, it might be a taking).
205. San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d
570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974); Builders Ass'n of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties
v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974).
206. But even that is reassuring in its consistency.
207. ThE TAKING IssuF, supra note 16, at 212-35.
208. They rely a bit broadly on Candlestick Properties, for example.
209. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,
193 A.2d 232, 241-42 (NJ. 1963).
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life sanctuaries, resulting in a 75 percent reduction in value. Again the
court emphasized that valid community goals could not be attained by
forced environmental philanthropy:
[A]lthough the objective of -the Fairfield flood and erosion control
board is a laudable one and although we have no reason to doubt the
high purpose of their action, these factors cannot overcome constitu-
tional principles. ... Where most of the value of a person's property
has to be sacrificed so that community welfare may be served, and
where the owner does not directly benefit from the evil avoided.
the occasion is appropriate for the exercise of eminent domain. 210
The Connecticut Supreme Court reaffirmed this position in 1971, strik-
ing down a zoning regulation which left the property owner with no
use except those associated with boats and ditches. His property value
shrank from $37,000 to $1,000.211
In another wetlands case-this time from Maine-the environmental
interests were again significant, but so was the method of public protec-
tion:
Between the public interest in braking and eventually stopping the
insidious despoliation of our natural resources which have for so long
been taken for granted, on the one hand, and the protection of appel-
lants' property rights on the other, the issue is cast.
Here the single Justice has found that the area of which appellants'
land is a part "is a valuable natural resource of the State of Maine and
plays an important role in the conservation and development of aquatic
and marine life, game birds and waterfowl," which bespeaks the public
interest involved and the protection of which is sought by Section 4702
of the Act. With relation to appellants' interest the single Justice found
that appellants' land absent the addition of fill "has no commercial value
whatever.". . .
The cost of its preservation should be publicly borne. To leave appel-
lants with commercially valueless land in upholding the restriction pres-
ently -imposed, is to charge them with more than their just share of the
cost of this state-wide conservation program, granting fully its commend-
able purpose . . . . [T]heir compensation by sharing in the benefits
which this restriction is intended to secure is so disproportionate to their
deprivation or reasonable use that such exercise of the State's police
power is unreasonable.212
210. Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770, 773-74 (Conn. 1964);
accord, Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d
619 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (ordinance designating subject property as temporary storage
basin in connection with flood control project enjoined as confiscatory).
211. Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 282 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1971).
212. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
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The Massachusetts Supreme Court decided several "environmental
regulation" cases recently.213  By 1970, it had obviously tired of the
game and curtly disposed of the town's position:
The preservation of privately owned land in its natural, unspoiled state
for the enjoyment and benefit of the public by preventing the owner
from using it for any practical purpose is not within the scope and limits
of any power or authority delegated to municipalities under the Zoning
Enabling Act.
214
Continuous case briefing and disputation would appear to be super-
fluous at this point. Suffice it to say that while some judges have in-
explicably215 gone off the deep end in approving questionable regula-
tions, most appear to have their feet solidly placed on the elementary
legal precept that
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.2 16
Unquestionably, a cogent argument can be made that the institution
of private property is an unworthy one, in that it may subordinate a
greater public good (as perceived by a government official) to selfish
individual concerns. But we do not write on some socio-political clean
213. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666 (Mass.
1965); Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 195 N.E.2d 341 (Mass. 1964).
214. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 255 N.E.2d 347, 351 (Mass. 1970).
215. Perhaps Chief Justice Traynor had the answer:
Apart from such homework on behalf of counsel to articulate the issues of a con-
troversy, an appellate judge still confronts his own homework. How can he be sure
that between counsel's efforts and his own all pertinent materials have been rounded
up? Suppose there lies undiscovered some pertinent statute still at large? Many
a judge is haunted by the muddle that ensues when a court overlooks such a statute
even when it is in plain sight. Thus an 1898 case in our state involving a land-
purchase contract overlooked a provision against forfeiture in the Civil Code. It
begat confusion for over fifty years, at last dispelled in a series of cases ending in
1951. A judge in 1960 mindful of the consequences of such an error of omission
is understandably apprehensive of possible oversights that might beget like confu-
sion until the year 2013 or longer.
Traynor, Badlands in An Appellate Judge's Realm of Reason, 7 UTAH L. RnV. 157, 159-
60 (1960) (footnote omitted).
216. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). And it bears emphatic
note that articulation of the above principle of social cost distribution was pioneered by
the California Supreme Court in inverse condemnation cases, long before Armstrong;
it remains firmly a part of our decisional law. See Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d
296, 303, 475 P.2d 441, 445, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (1970); Albers v. County of Los
Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 263, 398 P.2d 129, 136, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 96 (1965); Clement
v. State Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 642, 220 P.2d 897, 906 (1950); Bacich v.
Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943).
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slate. Both the federal and state constitutional conventions have cov-
ered much of the slate with deeply rooted policy decisions and value
judgments. Probably the central theme of the American constitutional
system is the ascription of positive value judgments to certain rights,
institutions and processes that are of such magnitude as to foreclose fu-
ture impairment even by the collective voice of the people speaking
through their legislative bodies, initiatives or referenda.
Pervading the entire constitutional structure is the principle that cer-
tain rights of the individual (including his property rights217) are to be
safeguarded even if such safeguards impair the efficient functioning of
various governmental decision-making endeavors. 21 8  That is what -the
Bill of Rights is all about. As a prominent member of California's ap-
pellate bench so aptly articulated:
Constitutional judgments no less than the adjudication of private dis-
putes demand that the bare words of the law be infused and warmed
by recognition of purpose and result. The Constitution is not a set of
neutral pronouncements. It is [a] structure of law implicit with values:
moral values, civic values, social values. It takes sides-usually the side
of the individual, guarding his security, his dignity, his claims to equal
and fair treatment, against the ponderous demands of the collective
state. There is nothing neutral in the assertion of freedom of the press,
in the guarantee against self-incrimination, -in the guarantees of due
process of law and equal protection of the laws.
219
Thus, the central point is that the zoning zealots' basic position con-
stitutes massive, and regrettable, confusion between ends and
means.22 In the final analysis, the means whereby governmental pur-
217. The recent observation of the United States Supreme Court seems quite perti-
nent.
[TJhe dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel,
is in truth a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check,
a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists be-
tween the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither
could have meaning without the other.
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (emphasis added).
218. In this context, it may be useful to recall that not even a presidential act of sei-
zure of private property to avert national catastrophe under warlike conditions can be
accomplished in disregard of constitutional limitations. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). And even where commandeering of private prop-
erty in wartime is permissible, the government must compensate the owner for damage
caused thereby. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
219. Friedman, The Courts and Social Policy, 47 CALiF. ST. B.J. 558, 563 (1972).
220. Query whether excessive regulation is not an unconstitutional bill of attainder
(see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1). A bill of attainder is defined simply as "a legis-
lative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial." Cummings v. Missouri,
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poses are accomplished distinguishes a free society from autocratic rule.
It is not by accident that our Constitutions safeguard so many proce-
dural rights which are the means whereby the substantive rights of the
citizenry are protected.22' As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts recently stated in an "environmental regulation" case:
The [governmental entities] argue as though all that need be done
is to demonstrate a public purpose and then no regulation.. can be
too extreme ....
In this conflict between the ecological and the constitutional, it is
plain that neither is to be consumed by the other. It is the duty of the
department of conservation to look after the interests of the former, and
it is the duty of the courts to stand guard over constitutional rights.222
VIII. THE ENVIRONMENT CAN BE PROTECTED WITHOUT TRAMPLING
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF INNOCENT LANDOWNERS.
ALL THAT NEEDS TO BE DONE IS TO ZONE RESTRICTIVELY
AND COMPENSATE FOR THE RESTRICTION
Planners and planning lawyers are fond of saying that there are only
two choices available: regulate the property restrictively or allow it to
be freely used in a manner which may not be consistent with public
needs:
Underlying all legal structure in the area of land-use control is a Hob-
son's choice between full compensation (under eminent domain) and
no compensation (under the police power). A land-use regulation that
falls as unconstitutional leaves a void. While the public might condemn
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867). A bill of attainder need not designate its victims
by name, but may do so by class or general description. Id. The punishment may
consist of confiscation of property or the profits thereof. Id. at 321 (quoting Black-
stone). Further, in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458-61 (1965), Chief Jus-
tice Warren indicated that the punishment (in order to be the type which is constitu-
tionally proscribed) need not be punitive or retributive, but might be merely preventive.
As the Court noted in Cummings:
The clauses in the Missouri Constitution, which are subject of consideration, do
not, in terms, define any crimes, or declare that any punishment shall be inflicted,
but they produce the same result upon the parties, against whom they are directed,
as though the crimes were defined and the punishment was declared.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 327.
Could it not be argued that people owning property sought to be environmentally pro-
tected by stringent regulation are being punished by legislative action by deprivation of
the right to use their property?
221. See, e.g., Estate of Buchman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 546, 559-60, 267 P.2d 73, 84
(1954).
222. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666, 671
(Mass. 1965).
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the affected property to achieve the public objective, -in America this
does not happen.228
Indeed, not surprisingly, most of the judicial decisions in this area deal
in blacks and whites, rather than varying shades of gray. But when
the only question before the court is "whether this ordinance is confis-
catory or not," it is really hard to expect much more from them.
Another problem leading to lack of planning flexibility is the pen-
chant of local agencies to consider an ordinance which approaches or
goes beyond the bounds of constitutionality and, in effect, to say "let's
just pass it and let the courts decide whether it's valid." '22  The prob-
lem with this approach is that it leaves the initiative-and the choice
of weapons-to the property owner. Thus, if the regulation is too se-
vere, he may seek to invalidate the ordinance,2 seek damages in in-
verse condemnation,226 or seek damages in federal court for either in-
verse condemnation (against the municipality)2 27 or for violation of the
Civil Rights Act228 (against individual municipal officials 29). Some-
how, one gets the impression that such a hit-or-miss system leaves
something to be desired for those who want to plan rationally for the
future.
28 0
There is, however, an alternative, a middle-ground, if you will, that
avoids the either/or extremes and protects the rights of the commu-
nity at the same time that it protects the rights of individual property
223. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVmONMM 501 (1966).
224. My experience is thus directly contrary to that related in Benson, supra note 16,
at 653-54. Compare Benson with Michelman, supra note 14, and Van Astyne, supra
note 19.
225. E.g., Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10
(1958).
226. E.g., Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391
(1969); Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
227. Beaver v. Borough of Johnsonburg, 375 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Dahl v.
City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538
(1972), in which the Supreme Court put an end to an anomalous line of older cases
which suggested that the Civil Rights Act did not protect property rights. For an excel-
lent example of the intellectual anguish which the now disapproved line of cases caused
conscientious federal judges, see Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 563-66 (2d Cir. 1969).
229. Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1971); Beaver v. Borough of John-
sonburg, 375 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Vazquez, 354 F.
Supp. 1355 (D.P.R. 1972); Inmobiliaria Borinquen, Inc v. Garcia Santiago, 295 F.
Supp. 203 (D.P.R. 1969); Shellburne, Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. Supp. 237 (D.
Del. 1968).
230. Of course, for those who prefer the political soap-box, the system does provide
periodic opportunities to blast either "developers" or "those damn courts" for interfering
in municipal affairs.
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owners who are fortunate (or unfortunate) enough to own property still
in an "unspoiled" state-regulate it in such a way as to preserve as
much of its natural state as is desired and compensate the owner for
whatever option is taken from him. 231  This system has been used ex-
tensively in England,2 31 sparingly in the United States,288 and com-
mended, in various forms, by numerous commentators. 84
231. Whatever happened to "scenic easements"? The acquisition of less than full fee
ownership for the purpose of preserving natural beauty (while compensating the owner)
is authorized. E.g., 23 U.S.C. § 319 (1970); CAL. GOv'T CoDE ANN. §§ 6950-54, 7000-
01 (West 1966); see Sussna, New Tools For Open Space Preservation, 2 URBAN LAW.
87 (1970). Yet the authorization is apparently being ignored by those who prefer to
attempt to steal these rights rather than purchase them.
232. The first enactment was in 1909, The Housing, Town Planning, & c. Act, 9
Edw. 7, c. 44, § 58(1), which provided:
Any person whose property is injuriously affected by the making of a town plan-
ning scheme shall.. . be entitled to obtain compensation in respect thereof from
the responsible authority.
The law has been revised several times, the current version being the Town and Country
Planning Act 1971, c. 78. For discussion, see generally C. HAAR, LAND PL.ANNINO IN
A FREE SoCIETY (1951); Hagman, Articles 1 and 2 of the ALl Model Land Develop-
ment Code: The English are Coming, 1971 ASPO LAND USE CONTROLS ANNUAL 3
(1972); Hagman & Pepe, English Planning Law: A Summary of Recent Developments,
11 HAnv. J. LEois. 557 (1974); Mandelker, Notes From the English: Compensation in
Town and Country Planning, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 699 (1961).
233. See Attorney General v. Williams, 55 N.E. 77 (Mass. 1899); State ex rel. Twin
City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 174 N.W. 885 (1919), rev'd on rehearing, 176 N.W.
159 (Minn. 1920); City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).
234. E.g., THE TAKING IssuE, supra note 16, at 302; J. DELAFONS, LAND USE CON-
TROLS IN Tim UNrrD STATES (2d ed. 1970); Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Dam-
ages-A New Cause of Action, 5 URBAN LAw. 25 (1973); Berger, A Policy Analysis
of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165 (1974); Bosselman, The Third Alterna-
tive in Zoning Litigation, 17 ZONING DIEST 73 (1965); Carmichael, Transferable
Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 35
(1974); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: A Proposal for Financing Landmark
Preservation, 1 RF-AL ESTATE L.J. 75 (1973); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer:
An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J 75 (1973); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive
Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HAnv. L. REV. 574 (1972);
Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1238 (1960); Hagman, A New Deal: Trading Windfalls for Wipeouts, PLANNING,
Sept., 1974, at 9; Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan
Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1961); Krasnowiecki & Strong, Compensable Regula-
tions for Open Space: A Means of Controlling Urban Growth, 29 J. AM. INST.
PLANNERS 87 (1963); Rose, From the Legislatures: Proposed Development Rights Legis-
lation Can Change the Name of the Land Investment Game, 1 REAL ESTATE, L.J. 276
(1973); Rose, A Proposal for the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights
as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EsTATE L.J. 635 (1974); Sussna, New
Tools For Open Space Preservation, 2 URBAN LAW. 87 (1970); Waite, Governmental
Power and Private Property, 16 CATH. U.L. REv. 283 (1967); Comment, An Evaluation
of the Rights and Remedies of a New York Landowner For Losses Due To Government
Action-With a Proposal for Reform, 33 ALBANY L. REv. 537 (1969); Comment,
Compensable Regulations: Outline of a New Land Use Planning Tool, 10 WILLAmETrE,
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Actually, once the theory is stated, there is little to add, except that
it will add rationality to long range planning and fair distribution of the
costs. 23 5 If all costs are known in advance, they can be planned for28
and rationally weighed. Rather than presuming that the luckless own-
er of an undeveloped parcel can be forced (by "mere" regulation) -to
donate its use (or non-use) to the public, the public will be in a posi-
tion to ask itself whether the "protection!' of that property is worth the
cost to it in dollars and cents. As Justice Sullivan aptly noted, "there
are many people who are unperturbed over the rights of their neigh-
bors largely because any challenge to their own seems remote.' '237  It
is sad (but, facing reality, it is also true) that too many in what is loose-
ly called the "environmental movement" are unconcerned with the
rights of individuals who may stand in the way of what they view as
right.23 s As Professor Kristol expressed it:
L.. 451 (1974); Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE
L.L 338 (1972); see Michelman, supra note 14; Van Alstyne, supra note 19.
235. Fairness is said to have been the touchstone of Chief Justice Warren's theory
of justice. See Tobriner, A Salute to Justices Burke and Mosk, 50 CALIF. ST. B.J. 14
(1975). It has long been the basis of "taking" law. E.g., United States v. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 631 (1961); United States v. Commodities Trading
Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949).
236. Rather than having courts in inverse condemnation decisions "unexpectedly" in-
ject unplanned and unexpected items into tightly drafted municipal budgets.
237. Sullivan, Bill of Rights Are Our Way of Life-Another View of Our Constitu-
tion, Los Angeles Daily J., Jan. 22, 1968, (Report Section), at 5.
238. For example, I remember a February 4, 1972 hearing before the California As-
sembly Judiciary Committee, at which a representative of the Sierra Club urged-with
what is recalled as a straight face-that because of "turkey drives" conducted by Indians
hundreds of years ago along the California coastline, a prescriptive easement in favor
of "the public" had been acquired, to which all privately-owned coastal property was sub-
ject. While no court to my knowledge has gone quite that far (cf. State ex rel. Thorn-
ton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Ore. 1969); compare Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290
(1967)), limited public theft of such property has been countenanced (Gion v. City of
Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970)). The extent of such
rights is now being thrashed out in trial courts. For my published views on this sub-
ject, see Berger, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: A License to Steal? 49 CALIF. ST. B.J.
2 (1974); Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last-At Least They Lose Their Property: Gion
v. City of Santa Cruz, 8 CALIF. W.L. REv. 75 (1971). For other views, pro and con,
see Armstrong, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Now You Own It-Now You Don't, 45
L.A. BAR BuLL. 529 (1970); Gallagher, Jure & Agnew, Implied Dedication: The
Imaginary Waves of Gion-Dietz, 5 Sw. U.L. REV. 48 (1973); Shavelson, Gion v. City
of Santa Cruz: Where Do We Go From Here?, 47 CALIF. ST. B.J. 414 (1972); Note,
The Supreme Court of California 1969-1970, 59 CALIF. L. Ray. 30, 231 (1971); Note,
Implied Dedication in California: A Need For Legislative Reform, 7 CALIF. W.L.
RaV. 259 (1970); Note, The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its
Effect on the California Coastline Property Owner: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 4
LoY. L.A.L REV. 438 (1971); Note, Californians Need Beaches-Maybe Yoursl, 7
SAN Dino L. Rav. 605 (1970); Comment, Implied Dedication: A Threat to the Owners
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There is in the United States a tradition of evangelical reform that
has no exact counterpart in any other nation ....
In some respects, this reform impulse is one of our glories. It gives
American politics a permanent moral dimension and moral thrust that
is entirely proper to a democratic republic, one of whose major functions
must be to ennoble the common men and women we all most certainly
are. But it has its dangers, too. It is so easy to move from the moral
to the moralistic, from a concern for what is right to a passionate self-
righteousness, from a desire to improve our social reality to a blind and
mindless assault against the real world which so stubbornly fails to con-
form to our ideological preconception. In short, the great temptation
which all American reform movements experience is to become a cru-
sade. It is a temptation, alas, that the reform impulse will frequently
succumb to, with all the disagreeable results that have always attended
upon crusades.
289
One way to temper the unfortunate excesses of the crusaders is to
confront them with the bill. Indeed, -to do so is no more than an ap-
plication of well-established law that when society benefits, society-
not some hapless individual-should pay.240  In sum, serious, rational
environmental planning cannot be done unless the public considers the
full cost.241 Beyond that, this type of regulation works not only in Eng-
land,242 but also in the United States. The system has been used here
to limit building height surrounding a public park,248 to preserve the
existing character of a unique historical boulevard, 244 and to restrict the
type of residential use to be made of property.2 45  In praising the con-
cept, the Missouri Supreme Court noted:
of California's Shoreline, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 327 (1971); Note, This Land is My
Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Application to California Beaches,
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1092 (1971); Comment, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV.
564 (1970); Comment, Public or Private Ownership of Beaches: An Alternative
to Implied Dedication, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 795 (1971).
239. Kristol, The Environmentalist Crusade, Wall Street J., Dec. 16, 1974, at 10, col.
4.
240. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.
3d 296, 475 P.2d 441, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970); Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 282 A.2d
907 (Conn. 1971); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); MacGibbon v. Board
of Appeals, 255 N.E.2d 347 (Mass. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963); Arverne Bay Constr. Co.
v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1938).
241. See Michelman, supra note 14, at 1181; Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of In-
tangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative Modifications in California, 16 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 491, 543-44 (1969).
242. Authorities cited in note 232 supra.
243. Attorney General v. Williams, 55 N.E. 77 (Mass. 1899).
244. Kansas City v. Liebi, 252 S.W. 404 (Mo. 1923).
245. State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 174 N.W. 885 (1919),
[Vol. 8
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
Zoning with compensation is a joint exercise of the power of eminent
domain and the police power. It is zoning with extraordinary considera-
tion for the property owners involved for it compensates those whose
property rights are taken in the process .... 246
The only argument raised against the concept of compensated regu-
lation is the morally moribund one that it will cost too much, i.e., the
governmental entities would just as soon have the burden placed on
the individuals who happen to be in the public's way. The argument
is unconscionable and has been repeatedly rejected in various contexts.
Perhaps the United States Supreme Court said it all in Watson v. Mem-
phis47: "[V]indication of conceded constitutional rights cannot be
made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny [them]
than to afford them."2 48  Other courts have echoed this eminently sensi-
ble and fair principle.249 In short, there is a way to protect every-
body's interest. All we need is the honesty and moral and intellectual
integrity to use it.
IX. CONCLUSION
And so we return to basics.
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free govern-
ment beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized
no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its
citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited con-
trol of even the most democratic depository of power, is after all but
rev'd on rehearing, 176 N.W. 159 (Minn. 1920); City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446
S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).
246. City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Mo. 1969).
247. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
248. Id. at 537.
249. Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1972), quoting Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571, 578 (8th Cir. 1968) (" '[humane considerations and constitutional re-
quirements are not, in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar considerations' ");
Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971) ("[ilnadequate resources
can never be an adequate justification for the state's depriving any person of his consti-
tutional rights"); accord, Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1322 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt
v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971);
Baldwin v. State, 6 Cal. 3d 424, 436, 491 P.2d 1121, 1128-29, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145, 152-
53 (1972); Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 304, 475 P.2d 441, 446, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 350 (1970); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 743, 441 P.2d 912, 922, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 82 (1968); Connor v. Great W. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 867,
447 P.2d 609, 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 (1968). For extended discussion, see Berger,
The California Supreme Court-A Shield Against Governmental Overreaching: Nestle
v. City of Santa Monica, 9 CALIF. W.L. Rav. 199, 244-59 (1973).
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a despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the many, of the majority,
if you choose to call it so, but it is none the less a despotism.20
Those words were uttered by the United States Supreme Court a hun-
dred years ago. Their validity endures.251
We are faced today with a heightened awareness of the abuse which
we have heaped upon our natural surroundings. We have literally em-
barked upon a crusade to change things and make them right. We
cannot, however, crush individual, human rights in the name of en-
vironmental concern and hope to have a social system worth preserving
when we are through.. 52 That is why the end cannot justify the means.
As the Supreme Court so recently noted, "a fundamental interdepend-
ence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right
in property. Neither could have meaning without the other."2 8
It is one thing to regulate. It is quite another to set up a system
in which interests, endemic to us as a species, are left to the whim
of an official or even to the whim of the majority. These times are
perilous to more than the environment. The people's confidence in
government is at an all-time low. To restore it, we must stand firm
in protecting the basic virtues that are the heart and soul of the Nation.
Only recently, newly appointed Attorney General Edward H. Levi
noted what he called, "an enormous amount of cynicism about the ad-
ministration of justice in the United States. ' 5
Mr. Levi's sad conclusion has prestigous company. With increasing
regularity, California's appellate justices have commented on the grow-
ing number of people who are losing faith in Government and ques-
tioning the quality of justice dispensed in the courts.2 Indeed, the
250. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662 (1875).
251. Their recently repeated echo by the Chief Justice and three Associate Justices
of the California Supreme Court is noteworthy: Mosk, Privacy in a Crowded World
is Sought, Los Angeles Daily J., Apr. 22, 1968, (Report Section), at 28; Sullivan, Bill
of Rights Are Our Way of Life-Another View of Our Constitution, Los Angeles Daily
J., Jan. 22, 1968, (Report Section), at 3; Tobriner, Individual Rights in an Industrialized
Society, 54 A.B.A.J. 21 (1968); Wright, supra note 42.
252. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to say that the stability which our society
has achieved derives from the ability to acquire and use land freely. Societies without
this tradition have, by comparison, been stultified. See Kristjanson & Penn, Public In-
terest in Private Land: Private and Public Conflicts, in LAND USE POLICY AND PROD-
LEMS IN THE UNrrED STATES 336-49 (H. Ottoson ed. 1963).
253. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
254. Ostrow, Levi Calls Broad Distrust of Law System a Problem, Los Angeles Times,
Feb. 4, 1975, pt. 1, at 4, col. 1.
255. See Thompson, Appellate Court Reform-The Near Term, 6 BEVMLY HILLS
B.J, Sept., 1972, at 9, 13, 18; Tobriner, Can Young Lawyers Reform Society Through
the Courts?, 47 CALIF. ST. B.J. 294 passim (1972); Wright, supra note 42, at 1268.
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California Court of Appeal recently took "judicial notice of the fact that
a large cross-section of the citizenry entertains an opinion that the Gov-
ernment is no longer representative of the people. 25 6
Those same learned jurists, while decrying the implications of their
own thoughts, express the view that when the just expectations of in-
dividuals are thwarted or bled lifeless by government officials, the in-
evitable result will be to "take to the streets. 25 7  Such a prospect is
far from fanciful if the insidious notion of unbridled regulation becomes
reality. The issues, instincts, values and needs which would be frus-
trated, obstructed and discommoded are simply too deep-seated to ig-
nore. Such a system would tear the fabric that binds us as a nation
and as a society. As Justice Cardozo remarked:
Deep into the soil go the roots of the words in which the rights of the
owners of the soil find expression in the law. We do not readily uproot
the growths of centuries.
258
There is room for regulation. More than that, there is a need for
regulation. But if it is truly to serve our best interests as a people,
it must be a balanced regulation; a type which is fair to all. In a way,
those calling for a change are right: we do need new, flexible tools
to deal with the modem world. The problem is that they really pro-
pose nothing new. Their "new" regulation is really no more than old-
hat Euclidean zoning without any safeguards. That just will not wash.
What will work is a realistic look at the governmental powers involved,
an abandonment of fascination with labels and an effort at purchasing
the hard-earned property which society wants to preserve. That may
not be the most sugar-coated message to deliver, but, in the late Chief
Justice's words, "it's fair."
256. Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 257-58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (1972).
257. See Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945. 957 (W.D. Mich. 1974);
W. DOUGLAS, PoINTs OF REBELT ON 78 (1970); Address by Arthur Goldberg to the
Cleveland Bar Association, quoted in 18 A.B. Nnws, Mar., .1973, at 6; Tobriner, Can
Young Lawyers Reform Society Through the Courts, 47 CALiF. ST. B.J. 294, 298
(1972); Wright, supra note 42, at 1268; compare Traynor, The Stinking Violets of
Violence, 4 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1 (1971); Kingsley, Change and Civil Disobedience, 5
BEvmy HiLus BJ., June-July, 1971, at 6.
258. Techt v. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y. 1920); see Reconstruction Fin. Corp.
v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1920) (Black, J.) ("[c]oncepts of real property
are deeply rooted in state traditions, customs, habits, and laws"); City of Knoxville v.
Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 18 (1909) (Moody, J.) ("[olur social system rests
largely upon the sanctity of private property, and the State or community which seeks
to invade it will soon discover the error in the disaster which follows"); Davis v. Mills,
194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904) (Holmes, J.) ("Mproperty is protected because such protec-
tion answers a demand of human nature, and therefore takes the place of a fight").
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